Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States
Attorneys
Sara Sun Beale*
The reputation and credibility of the Department of Justice were badly
tarnished during the Bush administration. This article focuses on concerns
regarding the role of partisan politics.1 Critics charge that during the Bush
administration improper partisan political considerations pervasively influenced a
wide range of decisions including the selection of immigration judges, summer
interns and line attorneys; the assignment of career attorneys to particular details;
the evaluation of the performance of United States Attorneys; and the decision
whether and when to file charges in cases with political ramifications.
The Inspector General’s lengthy and highly critical reports have substantiated
some of these charges.2 The first two Inspector General (IG) Reports found that
the Department improperly used political criteria in hiring and assigning some
immigration judges, interns, and career prosecutors.3
The third report
*
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1
Other serious concerns about the Department have been raised, particularly in connection
with its role in the war on terror. For example, the Department has been the subject of intense
criticism for legal analysis that led to the authorization of brutal interrogation techniques for
detainees. See, e.g., Norman W. Spaulding, Professional Independence in the Office of the Attorney
General, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1931, 1969–70 n.204 (2008) (collecting examples of the “burgeoning
literature” on the work of lawyers in the Bush administration who offered formal opinions that
purported to confer authority to torture and noting that most of the scholarship is “roundly
condemnatory”).
2
The reports that I call the Inspector General Reports were prepared jointly by the IG and
the Department of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). These reports are compiled
in AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006 (2008),
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0809a/final.pdf [hereinafter IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S.
ATTORNEYS]; AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING BY MONICA GOODLING AND
OTHER
STAFF
IN
THE
OFFICE
OF
THE
ATTORNEY
GENERAL
(2008),
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0807/final.pdf [hereinafter IG REPORT ON POLITICIZED HIRING IN
OFFICE OF AG]; and AN INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING IN THE DEPARTMENT
JUSTICE HONORS PROGRAM AND SUMMER LAW INTERN PROGRAM (2008),
OF
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0806/final.pdf [hereinafter IG REPORT ON HONORS PROGRAM AND
SLIP].
3
See IG REPORT ON HONORS PROGRAM AND SLIP, supra note 2, at 98 (concluding that in
2002 “the data indicated that the Committee considered political or ideological affiliations when
deselecting candidates” for entry level attorney positions and summer internships, and in 2006 “the
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recommended that a special prosecutor be appointed to determine whether one
U.S. Attorney was removed in an effort to influence voter fraud and corruption
prosecutions.4 As to the other U.S. Attorney dismissals, the report found that they
were done in an astonishingly slipshod fashion with little or no oversight (and no
candor during the Congressional and IG investigations), but in general, not for
improper reasons.5
There has been no resolution of other charges, made in Congressional
hearings and in the media, that political considerations improperly influenced the
course of other individual prosecutions, and that overall the Department’s
prosecutions were disproportionately focused on Democratic office holders, party
activists, and donors.
The Inspector General has proposed specific responses to some of the
problems identified in his reports, but these recommendations go principally to the
hiring and assignment of immigration judges, summer interns, and career
attorneys.6 Those are the easy issues because there is considerable agreement that
politics should play no role at all in decisions concerning career and nonpartisan
positions. The only challenge is to make sure that this principle is reiterated and
enforced.
The more difficult issue concerns the proper role of politics at the level of the
U.S. Attorneys. The position of U.S. Attorney is, in a formal sense, plainly
political: U.S. Attorneys are appointed by the president with the advice and
consent of the Senate,7 and they serve at the president’s pleasure.8 Once selected,
however, U.S. Attorneys are expected to leave behind partisan politics, adhering to
Screening Committee inappropriately used political and ideological considerations to deselect many
candidates”); IG REPORT ON POLITICIZED HIRING IN OFFICE OF AG, supra note 2, at 135–37 (finding
political considerations were used to evaluate candidates for certain career positions, including
AUSA positions, and in the selection or approval of career attorney candidates for temporary details,
and that the “most systematic use of political or ideological affiliations occurred” in the selection of
immigration judges).
4
IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 186–200, 357–58
(recommending that an independent counsel be appointed to investigate the removal of U.S. Attorney
David Iglesias to determine whether there were attempts to pressure him to accelerate his charging
decision in a corruption case or to initiate voter fraud investigations to affect the outcome of an
election, and to determine whether criminal conduct, including false statements and obstruction of
justice, had occurred).
5
Id. at 325, 356–58 (stating that removal process was “fundamentally flawed,” conducted in
a fashion that was “unsystematic and arbitrary . . . with little oversight,” and noting that
Congressional testimony and statements by the Attorney General and other Department officials were
“inconsistent, misleading, and inaccurate in many respects”).
6
IG REPORT ON HONORS PROGRAM AND SLIP, supra note 2, at 101–02 (recommending
revision of internal manuals, statements, and orders; additional briefing of political appointees; and
increased vigilance to ensure that political affiliations are not used as a criteria for evaluating
candidates).
7
28 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006).
8
28 U.S.C. § 541(c) (2006).
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the norm of prosecutorial neutrality. In this context, prosecutorial neutrality
means, at a minimum, that the decision whether and when to bring charges in
individual cases should be made without regard to either the political affiliation of
the individuals involved or the resulting benefit (or harm) to either political party.9
But one might argue that U.S. Attorneys who are selected by an overtly political
process and supervised by other political actors will naturally be influenced in their
decisions whether and when to prosecute, and that they will be likely to bring cases
to embarrass or disable political opponents, but fail to bring charges against
officials in their own party or their supporters. Some critics think that is exactly
what occurred during the Bush administration, and during earlier administrations
as well.10 Moreover, the nature of contemporary federal criminal law magnifies
the potential for mischief, because the definitions of the relevant offenses are both
broad and vague, giving the prosecutors extraordinarily wide discretion on which
there are few checks.11
The current structure and the problems encountered during the Bush
administration raise the question whether the role of the U.S. Attorney should be
reconceptualized. If partisan political considerations should not influence
prosecutorial decisions, why not insulate the position of U.S. Attorney from
politics by redefining it as a nonpartisan career appointment? There are structural
reasons to think that this would be desirable because it would place the Justice
Department’s structure in rough parity with that of other cabinet departments and
reduce the strain on the confirmation process at the beginning of a new presidential
administration. The strain on the confirmation process could also be reduced by
recharacterizing the U.S. Attorneys as political appointees not subject to Senate
confirmation. The current structure of the Justice Department is anomalous. In
comparison with other agencies, the Department has a disproportionate number of
presidential appointees subject to Senate confirmation. During the Bush
administration from 2001 to 2008, the Senate confirmed 134 appointees to
positions in the Justice Department, including the U.S. Attorneys for the 93 federal
judicial districts.12 In comparison, during the same period the Departments of
Treasury and Defense each had fewer than 30 presidential appointees confirmed by
9

For a general discussion of the various elements of prosecutorial neutrality and the
difficulty of applying that concept, see Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial
Neutrality, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 837. See also id. at 869 (stating that one element of prosecutorial
neutrality is nonpartisanship, which “encompasses both avoiding obligations to the political parties
with which they are affiliated (and which may have helped them obtain their positions) and holding
themselves above public outcry and frenzy about particular cases”).
10
See infra Part I.C and text accompanying notes 272–73.
11
See infra Part II.C.2.
12
Memorandum from Amy Taylor, Reference Librarian, Duke Law Library, to Professor
Sara Sun Beale, Duke Law Sch. 1 (Oct. 29, 2008) (on file with author) (noting that as of Oct. 29,
2008, there had been 147 nominations and 134 confirmations for the Department of Justice,
excluding nominations of judges and U.S. marshals, which are attributable to the Department for
some purposes).
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the Senate, though both have more employees than the Justice Department.13 The
Department of State’s numbers were comparable to those of the Justice
Department, but that reflects the inclusion of all ambassadors.14 Indeed, I am not
aware of any agency other than the Justice Department in which the head of each
small domestic field office is a presidential appointee subject to Senate
confirmation.
The presidential appointment of the U.S. Attorneys tends to reinforce a degree
of autonomy for the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in each district, and this article also
explores a distinct but closely related issue: the appropriate degree of centralization
of authority within the Department of Justice.
This article first sets forth an account of the problems disclosed by the IG’s
report and related congressional investigations, and then explores the historical
development of the role of the U.S. Attorneys, their relationship to the Attorney
General and the Department of Justice, and the role they play in the contemporary
federal criminal justice system. With that background in mind, I return to the
question whether it would be desirable to alter the character of the position. I
conclude that, on balance, converting the U.S. Attorneys to a career civil service
role is neither politically feasible nor desirable. No one doubts that the Attorney
General and the heads of the divisions within the Department (which I will refer to
collectively as the leadership of “Main Justice”) are and will always be political
appointees. The appointment of these officials is the mechanism by which each
new presidential administration establishes and carries out its policies and
priorities. As long as the U.S. Attorneys remain subject to the oversight and
direction of the political leadership at Main Justice, it will not be possible to
preclude entirely the possibility that political considerations might improperly
influence decisions in individual prosecutions. Nor would it be desirable to
eliminate the requirement of Senate confirmation for U.S. Attorneys.
The current appointment process for U.S. Attorneys has several advantages.
It creates a desirable counterweight to Main Justice in two distinct ways. First, it
provides a political counterweight, because the U.S. Attorneys have their own
political influence and constituencies. Second, because the U.S. Attorneys are
political figures drawn from their districts and confirmed with the support of their
home-state senators, they also serve as a counterweight to excessive centralization
and uniformity within the federal system. There is real value in a structure that
delegates federal prosecutorial power to local districts, reinforcing federalism and
allowing federal law to be adapted to different conditions. The current system also
13
Id. at 2 (noting that during the same period the Treasury Department had 25 nominations
and 25 confirmations, and the Department of Defense had 28 nominations and 27 confirmations).
Between 2001 and 2006, the average number of employees in each department was as follows:
107,146 in the Justice Department, 114,574 in the Treasury, and 604,758 in the Department of
Defense. Id. at 3–5.
14
Id. at 1–2 (noting that the Department of State had 228 confirmations, including 153
ambassadors, during the same period; State had a total of 259 nominations, including 181
ambassadors and 78 other nominations).
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has several other major advantages. A presidential appointment gives the U.S.
Attorney desirable prestige that helps him or her carry out the federal law
enforcement mission and it increases the accountability of the U.S. Attorneys.
Bringing in an outsider may also increase the fairness and accuracy of federal
prosecuting by reducing institutional tunnel vision. I am agnostic on the final issue
which system would attract the stronger candidates to the position.
Although the advantages of maintaining the current model of the U.S.
Attorney as a presidential appointee outweigh the disadvantages, there are still
reasons for concern. Accordingly, I argue that serious consideration should be
given to mechanisms that would moderate the effect of partisan politics at the
appointment stage, and mechanisms to help insulate U.S. Attorneys from improper
partisan pressures that may arise from within the executive branch, from Congress,
or from local political leaders.
Section I of this article provides background on recent events that suggest the
nature of the problem. Section II describes the history and contemporary role of
the U.S. Attorney. Section III describes the political complexity of the current
appointments process. Section IV considers the options for reform. Two possible
objections could be made to undertaking this analysis. First, fundamental change
is unlikely, because it would diminish the power of the president and the Senate,
both of which must concur to amend the legislation governing the selection and
removal of U.S. Attorneys. And second, the political corruption cases that are at
the center of this analysis are only a small fraction of the federal criminal caseload.
Despite the enormous political obstacles, I believe it is important to take seriously
the option of restructuring the role of the U.S. Attorney to reduce the danger of
improper partisan influence, while at the same time taking into account the broader
ramifications of such a change. The unprecedented power now wielded by federal
prosecutors has heightened the stakes, making it imperative to look with a fresh
eye at the structure that governs federal prosecutions. And even though federal
prosecutions for political corruption make up only a small portion of the federal
caseload, they perform a critical function, policing the integrity of the government
at the federal, state, and local levels. It may be true that no fundamental change
will occur in the absence of a scandal or some other major shock to the system, but
such scandals have occurred in the past and may occur again. One of the questions
examined in Part I of this article is whether events during the Bush Administration
demonstrate the need for such fundamental change.
Although the IG reports, Congressional investigations, and my review of the
evolution of the federal system provide a rich basis against which to consider these
issues, I note with regret the lack of any empirical research assessing the impact of
the selection process for U.S. Attorneys.
I. SIGNS OF A NEED FOR REFORM?
Recent events have shone a spotlight on concerns about the exercise of
prosecutorial discretion in the federal system, providing rich background against
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which to assess the need for reform. These events include the removal of nine U.S.
Attorneys, changes in the procedure for appointing interim U.S. Attorneys, and
evidence that partisan motivations may have influenced politically sensitive
prosecutions.
A. The United States Attorney Firings
The firing of nine U.S. Attorneys in 2006 sparked a public firestorm that
prompted both Congress and the IG to investigate.15 Although both Congress and
the IG considered the circumstances surrounding each of the cases, I will focus on
four that are illustrative of the key issues raised by the current system of appointing
and removing U.S. Attorneys: David Iglesias, Todd Graves, Bud Cummins, and
Carol Lam.
1. David Iglesias
The IG found that the most serious allegations concerned the removal of
David Iglesias, who served as U.S. Attorney in New Mexico.16 The IG report
concluded “with reasonable assurance that the complaints from New Mexico
Republican politicians and party activists about Iglesias’ handling of voter fraud
and corruption cases were the reasons for his removal as U.S. Attorney.”17 In his
Congressional testimony Iglesias expressed his own belief that he was asked to
resign because he failed to respond to political pressure to indict before the 2006

15
See, e.g., Todd J. Gillman, Embattled AG Gonzales Resigns, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug.
28, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 16775486 (reporting attorney general’s resignation and relating it
to the “the uproar over the bungled, politically charged firings of eight U.S. Attorneys”); Amy
Goldstein & Dan Eggen, Senators Deride Justice Reassignments: Prosecutor Firings and Staff
Decisions Draw Hill Criticism, WASH. POST, June 22, 2007, at A3 (discussing the Senate reaction to
the U.S. Attorney firings and allegations of partisan hiring practices); Amy Goldstein & Dan Eggen,
Voter-Fraud Complaints Drove Dismissals, WASH. POST, May 14, 2007, at A4 (discussing allegation
that the actions of the fired U.S. Attorneys with regard to voter fraud cases were factors in the firings,
especially that of David Iglesias); Tom Hamburger, A Targeted Prosecutor, a Pattern, L.A. TIMES,
May 31, 2007, at 1 (describing “backlash among some Minnesota Republicans” and their calls for
attorney general’s resignation “largely as a result of the U.S. attorney firings” and revelations about
pressures on local U.S. Attorney concerning Indian voting rights); Jennifer Sullivan, Sullivan Picked
to Keep Serving as U.S. Attorney, SEATTLE TIMES, Sept. 27, 2007, at B1 (noting “uproar” over the
firing of local U.S. Attorney and others “led to congressional hearings, and U.S. Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales eventually resigned”); Andrew Zajac, Pointing the Way For Prosecutors: Under
Fire, Not In Retreat, CHI. TRIB., June 17, 2007, at 4 (describing “political crisis over the firing of nine
U.S. attorneys, a rare potential vote of no-confidence in the Senate and numerous calls for [the
attorney general’s] resignation, and criticizing his response as “tightening the leash on the men and
women who prosecute federal crimes across the nation”).
16
IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 149–200 (discussing
circumstances of Iglesias’ removal).
17
Id. at 197.
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election.18 He described receiving calls from both Senator Domenici and
Representative Wilson regarding the status of a pending corruption matter and
stated that in both instances he felt that he was being pressured to bring an
indictment before the November election.19 After the Domenici call he “felt ill,”
because he “believed Domenici had asked for confidential information about an
ongoing investigation, and that Iglesias would pay in some way for refusing to
cooperate with him.”20 Domenici admitted calling Iglesias but denied any
improper intent.21 Senator Domenici also made multiple calls to the Attorney
General and to the Deputy Attorney General complaining about Iglesias’
performance.22 Additionally, Iglesias received pressure on multiple occasions
from local Republican officials demanding action on voter fraud before the
elections.23 Domenici and state Republican leaders also complained about Iglesias
to the various officials in the White House, including Karl Rove.24
The IG report concludes that the facts uncovered to date may establish
criminal conduct as well as pressure on Iglesias to violate Departmental
regulations and/or professional standards. In the IG’s view, an attempt to pressure
a prosecutor to accelerate the filing of political corruption charges or to initiate
voter fraud investigations for the purposes of affecting the outcome of an
upcoming election would clearly be improper and might constitute a crime.25
Moreover, under both departmental regulations and professional standards, Iglesias
had a duty to prosecute cases without regard to partisan political considerations.26
Departmental regulations, which are intended to shield prosecutors from improper
political pressures, also require that any requests from members of Congress to
18

Id. at 152.
Id. at 152. See also id. at 159–60 (describing Rep. Wilson’s 2004 letter to Iglesias
complaining about what she perceived to be voter fraud in her district and Wilson’s dissatisfaction
with his response).
20
Id. at 179.
21
Domenici admitted making the call and also recommending Iglesias’ removal, but he
denied pressuring or threatening Iglesias. The Senate Select Committee on Ethics investigated the
call and issued a Public Letter of Qualified Admonition to the Senator. Id. at 180–81. The letter
stated that the call created an appearance of impropriety, but that the investigation had found “no
substantial evidence to determine that [Domenici] attempted to improperly influence an ongoing
investigation.” Id. at 181.
22
Id. at 168–70, 174–75, 179–81.
23
Id. at 158–59, 161–62, 164.
24
Id. at 165–66, 172–74, 190.
25
Id. at 199–200 (suggesting that such pressure could constitute obstruction of justice or wire
fraud).
26
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL §§ 9-27.000 & 927.260(A)(3) [hereinafter USAM]; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND DEFENSE FUNCTION 3-1.3(f) (3d ed. 1993) (prosecutor’s professional judgment should not be
influenced by his or her political interests); id. at 3-3.9(d) (in making decision to prosecute,
“prosecutor should give no weight to the personal or political advantages or disadvantages which
might be involved”).
19
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U.S. Attorneys’ Offices for confidential information must be promptly reported,
but Iglesias failed to report the calls by Domenici and Wilson.27 Finally, the IG
noted that other criminal conduct—such as false statements to Congress or the IG
investigators—may have occurred during the investigation of Iglesias’ removal.28
The IG was unable to uncover the full factual record because some key
witnesses—including Karl Rove, Harriet Miers, and Senator Domenici—refused to
be interviewed, and critical documents were not made available.29 Indeed, the
record does not establish whether the individuals who sought Iglesias’ removal
were acting solely on the belief that he was not competently prosecuting
worthwhile cases or for the purpose of influencing the upcoming elections.30
Accordingly, the IG recommended the appointment of a special counsel to
continue the investigation,31 and the Attorney General accepted this
recommendation, appointing a special prosecutor to complete the investigation of
the removal of Iglesias and related matters.32
Given the facts reported by the IG, the Iglesias case reveals the potential for
partisan pressures to be exerted on U.S. Attorneys from multiple sources. Some of
the pressure on Iglesias came directly from Congress and, particularly, from
Senator Domenici, upon whose influence and patronage Iglesias had relied.
Iglesias regarded Senator Domenici as his “mentor.”33 Indeed, before Iglesias
became U.S. Attorney, he met with Senator Domenici at an Albuquerque
restaurant for what Iglesias later described as “a kiss-the-ring ceremony that gave
27

IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 194–95 (citing USAM § 1-

8.010).
28

Id. at 198. The White House has also asserted executive privilege to block the
Congressional investigation. See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
29
IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 153–54. In March 2009 the
chairman of the House Judiciary Committee reportedly negotiated an agreement under which Rove
and Miers would give depositions under oath, though they would not testify in public. Susan
Crabtree, Rove, Conyers Reach Deal on Testimony, THE HILL, Mar. 4, 2009,
http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/rove-conyers-reach-deal-on-testimony-2009-03-04.html.
30
IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 199.
31
Id. at 198.
32
Attorney General Michael Mukasey appointed Nora Dannehy, Acting United States
Attorney in Connecticut, “to conduct further investigation as needed, and ultimately to determine
whether any prosecutable offense was committed with regard to the removal of a U.S. Attorney or the
testimony of any witness related to the U.S. Attorney removals.” Press Release, Statement by
Attorney General Michael B. Mukasey on the Report of an Investigation into the Removal of Nine
U.S.
Attorneys
in
2006
(Sept.
29,
2008),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/September/08-opa-859.html. Mukasey said that Dannehy would
exercise the authority of the United States Attorney for the District of Columbia for purposes of this
matter and report to him through the Deputy Attorney General. Id. See also Eric Lichtblau & Sharon
Otterman, Special Prosecutor Named in Attorney Firings Case, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008,
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/30/washington/30attorney.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss
(describing Dannehy’s background and the events leading up to appointment).
33
DAVID IGLESIAS WITH DAVIN SEAY, IN JUSTICE: INSIDE THE SCANDAL THAT ROCKED THE
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 52 (2008).
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[him] the go-ahead to pursue [his] ambitions according to Domenici’s wisdom and
wishes.”34 Local Republican politicians and party activists also sought to influence
Iglesias directly. Pressure was also channeled through the White House and the
senior leadership in the Department, which received complaints about Iglesias
from state party leaders as well as Domenici and Wilson. Indeed, although Iglesias
served at the pleasure of the president, he recognized that he also had to contend
with political forces generated in New Mexico.35
As recognized in the IG report, Iglesias’ removal also spotlights the inevitable
difficulty in separating improper partisan motivations from proper support for
bringing well-founded cases involving political corruption or voter fraud by
members of the political party that does not control the executive branch.
2. Todd Graves
The IG also found that political pressure from the home-state senator was the
reason for the forced resignation of a second U.S. Attorney, Todd Graves, who
served as U.S. Attorney in the Western District of Missouri.36 In Graves’s case,
however, the IG concluded that the pressure was unrelated to the work of the U.S.
Attorney’s Office. Graves, whose brother was a Missouri congressman, earned the
ire of Senator Christopher “Kit” Bond’s staff when he refused to become involved
in a dispute between the staffs of the senator and the congressman.37 In his
interview with the IG, the former U.S. Attorney confirmed the “‘friction’” between
the congressional and senatorial staffs, his refusal to use his influence to have the
congressman’s chief of staff fired, and that he was informed by Bond’s staff that as
a result “‘they could no longer protect [his] job.’”38
The IG found it troubling that the Department of Justice made no effort in
Graves’s case to protect the “independence of federal prosecutors, by ensuring that
otherwise effective U.S. Attorneys are not removed for improper political
reasons.”39 Indeed, little, if any, effort was made by Departmental officials even to
determine the reasons for the pressure from Bond’s staff for Graves’s removal.40
3. Bud Cummins
The IG concluded that the main reason H. E. “Bud” Cummins III was asked
to resign from his position as U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of Arkansas
34

Id.
Id. at 53 (“To assume that being U.S. Attorney, at that time and in that state, would not
come with any political baggage would be like walking right into a minefield.”).
36
IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 99–114.
37
Id. at 105–08, 111–14.
38
Id. at 108.
39
Id. at 113.
40
Id.
35
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was to open up a position for a former White House official.41 Deputy Attorney
General Paul McNulty testified to Congress that Cummins was dismissed solely to
make way for Tim Griffin, a former aide to senior White House official Karl
Rove.42 The Attorney General’s Chief of Staff, Kyle Sampson, said in e-mail that
it was “important to . . . Karl” that Griffin have the position of U.S. Attorney in the
Eastern District of Arkansas.43 Although some Departmental officials had
suggested that Cummins was removed because of his weak performance, the IG
found this claim to be unsupported.44 To the contrary, the director of the Executive
Office of United States Attorneys had just visited Cummins’ district and found it
performing at a high level.45
The Cummins case demonstrates the effect of the principle that as political
appointees, the U.S. Attorneys serve at the pleasure of the President and may be
removed for any reason, including the President’s decision to appoint another
person to the position. It is also of interest because Kyle Sampson, the Attorney
General’s Chief of Staff, recommended using new statutory authority to bypass the
Senate confirmation process, appointing Griffin for an indefinite “interim” term
that would continue for the last two years of the President’s term.46 Upon learning
of continued opposition from Arkansas Senator David Pryor, Griffin withdrew
from consideration for the permanent U.S. Attorney position.47 The process for
appointing interim U.S. Attorneys during this period is discussed below.
4. Carol Lam
The forced resignation of Carol Lam, who served as U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of California, raised concern that she had been removed because
of her aggressive pursuit of political corruption by Republican office holders and
lobbyists. Lam successfully prosecuted former Republican Congressman Randy
“Duke” Cunningham and had announced plans to pursue the former Executive
Director of the CIA in connection with the case.48 She had also begun an
investigation of Republican Congressman Jerry Lewis following the disclosure that
one of his staff aides became a lobbyist and arranged earmark contracts worth
hundreds of millions.49
41

Id. at 115, 147.
Id. at 136.
43
Id. at 138.
44
IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 142–45.
45
Id. at 126.
46
See infra text accompanying notes 59–69.
47
IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 140.
48
See John McKay, Train Wreck at the Justice Department: An Eyewitness Account, 31
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 265, 285–86 (2008).
49
Editorial, Politics and the Corruption Fighter, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at A26.
42
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Although critics noted that Kyle Sampson proposed Lam’s removal
immediately after she announced plans to extend her investigation beyond
Cunningham,50 the IG found “no evidence” that the prosecution or investigation of
Republicans “had anything to do with” her removal.51 Instead, the IG concluded
that Lam was removed because of her failure to adhere to the President’s and
Department’s priorities by bringing an insufficient number of gun and immigration
cases.52 The IG also found that in 2004, 2005, and 2006, members of Congress
publicly criticized Lam’s record on immigration cases.53 Although some of the
complaints came from individual members, in 2004 fourteen members wrote the
Attorney General to criticize her office’s response to alien smuggling, and nineteen
members wrote to the President a year later.54 The issue was also raised when the
Attorney General testified in a House oversight hearing.55 Lam acknowledged to
departmental officials that her numbers were lower than those of other border
districts but attributed the difference to her policy of prosecuting a smaller number
of more serious cases that required more resources and resulted in longer
sentences.56
Although attributing Lam’s dismissal to her failure to adhere to the
Administration’s priorities, the report noted other “troubling” aspects of her case;
despite the fact that Lam’s performance was otherwise exemplary, officials in
Main Justice never seriously examined her explanations for the low number of
prosecutions in her office, nor did they discuss with her the need to improve these
statistics or face removal.57

50

The day after Lam’s announcement, Sampson wrote to White House Counsel about “[t]he
real problem we have right now with Carol Lam that leads me to conclude that we should have
someone ready to be nominated on 11/18, the day her 4-year term expires.” E-mail from Kyle
Sampson, Chief of Staff to Alberto Gonzales, to William Kelley, Deputy Assistant to the President
and Deputy Counsel (May 11, 2006), available at http://www.talkingpointsmemo.com/docs/lamemails.
51
IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 285. Indeed, the IG noted
that “the investigation and prosecution of Cunningham and Foggo [the CIA official] were
aggressively pursued by career prosecutors in Lam’s office, both during and after her tenure.” Id.
Sampson told Congress that the “problem” to which he referred in the e-mail was not related to
the ongoing Cunningham matter. U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee Holds a Hearing on U.S.
Attorney Firings, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2007 (testimony of Kyle Sampson, in response to questions
from
Sen.
Feinstein),
http://media.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/documents/sampson_transcript032907.html.
52
IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 272–73.
53
Id. at 277.
54
Id. at 277–78.
55
Id. at 278.
56
Id. at 281.
57
Id. at 286 (noting that Lam’s office had received a positive EARS evaluation, and that she
had been described by Associate Deputy Attorney General Margolis as “otherwise ‘outstanding,’
‘tough,’ and ‘honest’”).
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Given the lack of notice to Lam of the seriousness of her failure to increase
gun and immigration prosecutions, her high-profile prosecution of corrupt
Republican office holders, and the timing of her forced removal, her case was
seen—not without some justification—as an example of what would happen to
U.S. Attorneys who failed to toe the line and be what some called “loyal Bushies.”
Particularly in light of the Department’s failure to provide a coherent and credible
account of the reason for the various dismissals, Lam’s removal created the
appearance of improper partisan influence.
Lam’s case also illustrates several other significant issues. First, based upon
the IG’s report, this was the clearest example of the removal of a U.S. Attorney as
a means of enforcing the priorities of the President and the political leadership of
the Department. Lam’s replacement contributed to a more uniform national
approach, but it did so by overriding a policy that was arguably tailored to meet the
needs of an individual district. The district’s statistics on immigration cases were
low precisely because Lam had adopted a policy of devoting significant resources
to immigration cases, but using them to bring a smaller number of more serious,
resource-intensive cases. Her removal can thus be seen as an example of the
tension between uniform national policies and those tailored to individual districts.
It is worth noting that the political leadership in the Department never seriously
considered Lam’s approach or gave her an opportunity to make a case for it.58
Finally, the Lam case demonstrates that in some cases, members of Congress,
individually and collectively, take a keen interest in the activities of individual
U.S. Attorneys.
B. The Interim U.S. Attorney Loophole
As noted above, Kyle Sampson proposed that Tim Griffin (the replacement
for Bud Cummins) be nominated as interim U.S. Attorney and serve without
Senate confirmation for the last two years of President Bush’s term. Sampson
sought to exploit an obscure provision, enacted in the March 2006 Patriot Act
reauthorization regarding the appointment of interim U.S. Attorneys, to bypass
Senate confirmation altogether. Whereas previously, an interim U.S. Attorney
selected by the Attorney General could only serve 120 days before the district
court appointed an interim U.S. Attorney,59 the new provision provided that an
interim appointed by the Attorney General could serve indefinitely, without
nomination by the President or confirmation by the Senate.60 The legislation was
58
A summer intern was assigned to evaluate Lam’s approach but lacked the necessary
expertise and failed to complete the assignment. Id. at 282.
59
The 120-day limit on the term of acting U.S. Attorneys was set in 1986. See Criminal Law
and Procedure Technical Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-646, § 69, 100 Stat. 3616-17
(1986) (amended 2006). Before that, 28 U.S.C. § 546 (1982) authorized the district court to fill a
vacancy with an acting U.S. Attorney until the President appointed a person with the advice and
consent of the Senate.
60
See USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, §
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added quietly, with no discussion, to the bill at the Department’s request by a
staffer on the Senate Judiciary Committee, Brett Tollman, who was himself later
appointed U.S. Attorney in Utah.61
In an e-mail, Kyle Sampson, the Attorney General’s chief of staff, stated that
“I strongly recommend that as a matter of Administration policy, we utilize the
new statutory provisions that authorize the AG to make appointments,” because by
bypassing the confirmation process “we can give far less deference to home-state
Senators and thereby get (1) our preferred person appointed and (2) do it faster and
more efficiently, at less political cost to the White House.”62 Referring to
objections from the Arkansas senators, Sampson wrote “we should ‘gum this to
death’ . . . and ‘run the clock’ while appearing to be acting in ‘good faith’ by
asking the Senators for their recommendations, interviewing other candidates, and
pledging to desire a Senate-confirmed U.S. Attorney.”63
The Attorney General told the IG that he did not support Sampson’s plan to
bypass the confirmation process, and the IG “did not find evidence” to the
contrary.64 Although Sampson himself later sought to minimize his e-mails as just
a bad idea at the staff level, the IG notes that Sampson advocated the plan, began
to implement it, and abandoned it only after determined opposition from Senator
Pryor as well as the controversy surrounding the U.S. Attorney firings.65 In fact,
critics charge that the political leadership at the Department of Justice relied upon
the Patriot Act authority to generate its own list of replacements for the fired U.S.
Attorneys rather than deferring to the recommendations of home-state Senators, as
is traditional, and that it relied upon this authority to appoint approximately twenty
interim U.S. Attorneys.66 These interim U.S. Attorneys had less authority to hire
career prosecutors for their offices than their presidentially appointed and
senatorially confirmed peers.67 The Department’s White House Liaison, Monica
Goodling, assumed the responsibility of hiring new Assistant United States
Attorneys (AUSAs) in offices with interim U.S. Attorneys, and the IG found in a
separate report that Goodling’s hiring decisions turned on partisan
considerations.68
502, 120 Stat. 192 (2006).
61
See Daniel Richman, Federal Sentencing in 2007: The Supreme Court Holds—The Center
Doesn’t, 117 YALE L.J. 1374, 1391 (2008).
62
IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 130.
63
Id. at 133.
64
Id. at 147.
65
Id. at 146–47.
66
James Eisenstein, The U.S. Attorney Firings of 2006: Main Justice’s Centralization Efforts
in Historical Context, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 219, 248 (2008) [hereinafter Eisenstein, U.S. Attorney
Firings].
67
See id. at 256 n.113; IG REPORT ON POLITICIZED HIRING IN OFFICE OF AG, supra note 2, at
25–26.
68
IG REPORT ON POLITICIZED HIRING IN OFFICE OF AG, supra note 2, at 25–46. See also
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In the wake of the controversy over the firings, Congress restored the 120-day
limit with the Preserving United States Attorney Independence Act of 2007, which
President Bush signed on June 14, 2007.69
Although the scheme to exploit the Patriot Act authority was short lived, it
highlights the degree to which the requirement of Senate confirmation imposes real
limitations on the president’s choices for the post of U.S. Attorney, forcing the
president to take account of preferences in the Senate and especially those of
home-state senators. It also emphasizes another aspect of the normal independence
of U.S. Attorneys, their ability to hire the AUSAs of their own choice, rather than
candidates preferred by officials in Main Justice.
C. Evidence of Partisan Influences on Prosecutorial Discretion
The dismissals of U.S. Attorneys David Iglesias and Carol Lam, discussed
above, show the danger that U.S. Attorneys may face explicit pressure to exercise
prosecutorial discretion in a manner that advances partisan political goals, or may
fear removal if their prosecutorial decisions do not in fact advance such goals.
Although it appears that neither Iglesias nor Lam succumbed to such pressure,
critics charge that in other instances prosecutorial discretion in the federal system
has been tainted by partisan considerations. These claims are the subject of an
ongoing investigation by the House Committee on the Judiciary Committee. The
Committee has heard from critics of the administration, but the assertion of
executive privilege has prevented the Committee from obtaining testimony and
documentary evidence from past and present officials in the White House.70 The
discussion below is based upon the October 2007 congressional hearing71 and the

Eisenstein, supra note 66, at 255–57 (describing Goodling’s hiring practices).
69
See Preserving United States Attorney Independence Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-34, § 3,
121 Stat. 224 (2007).
70
The Committee has subpoenaed Harriet Miers (former counsel to the president), Josh
Bolton (the president’s chief of staff), and Karl Rove, all of whom have refused to appear on the
grounds of executive privilege. The House of Representatives voted to hold Miers and Bolton in
contempt of Congress and passed a resolution authorizing litigation to enforce compliance with the
subpoena. See Resolution Recommending that the House of Representatives Find Harriet Miers and
Joshua Bolton, Chief of Staff, White House, in Contempt of Congress for Refusal to Comply With
Subpoenas Duly Issued by the Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. Res. 110-423, 110th Cong. (2007),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/ContemptReport071105.pdf.
See also
Committee on the Judiciary v. Harriet Miers, 542 F.3d 909 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (describing action in
Congress leading to litigation). Although the district court ordered Miers and Bolton to comply with
the subpoena, the court of appeals granted a stay pending appeal and denied the motion for
expedition, indicating that it would be beneficial to have the views of a new President and new House
of Representatives. Id. An agreement has reportedly been reached for Rove and Miers to give
deposition testimony under oath. See supra note 29.
71
Allegations of Selective Prosecution: The Erosion of Public Confidence in our Federal
Justice System: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2007) [hereinafter
House Hearing on Allegations of Selective Prosecution].
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report prepared by the Majority Staff of the House Committee on the Judiciary,72
as well as other publicly available materials.
The evidence presented by critics at congressional hearings and in related
investigations falls into two categories: statistical evidence and evidence
concerning individual prosecutions. Since there has been no resolution of these
charges, which remain under investigation, they stand on a different and weaker
footing than the IG’s report.
1. Statistical disparity
Professor Donald Shields of the University of Missouri presented statistical
data on political corruption investigations during the Bush Administration. Shields
testified to Congress in 2007 regarding an eight-year longitudinal study he
conducted on, what he described as federal political profiling of federal, state, and
local political officeholders.73 His study tracked more than 800 political corruption
investigations led by U.S. Attorneys under Attorneys General Ashcroft and
Gonzales. Shields concluded that the disparity between investigations of
Democrats versus Republicans was statistically significant beyond the .0001
level.74 Although only fifty percent of elected officials in the United States
reported being Democrats during the period in question, Shields found that eighty
percent of those investigated by the Bush Administration were Democrats.75
The Shields study has not been peer-reviewed and is subject to very
significant limitations.
First, although Shields testified that his research
demonstrates “political profiling” and “selective investigation and prosecution
[rates],”76 he analyzed only the reports of investigations that appeared in national
and local television and newspaper accounts or in federal press releases.77 Thus
his study does not include investigations that were not publicized (or that escaped
his search terms78), and it does not separate investigations that led to charges from
72

MAJORITY STAFF OF H.R. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 110th CONG., ALLEGATIONS OF
SELECTIVE PROSECUTION IN OUR FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 1 (Comm. Print 2008)
(prepared for Chairman John Conyers, Jr.), available at http://www.folo.us/wpcontent/uploads/2008/04/house-judish-majority-staff-report.pdf [hereinafter HOUSE STAFF REPORT].
73
House Hearing on Allegations of Selective Prosecution, supra note 71, at 226–70 (written
statement by Prof. Donald Shields entitled “An Empirical Examination of the Political Profiling of
Elected Officials: A Report on Selective Investigations and/or Indictments by the DOJ’s Attorneys
under Attorneys General Ashcroft and Gonzales”).
74
Id. at 225 (testimony of Prof. Shields), 230 (written statement of Prof. Shields).
75
Id. at 224 (testimony of Prof. Shields), 268 (table 2). In comparison, forty-one percent
were Republicans, and nine percent reported themselves to be Independent or Other. Id.
76
Id. at 225 (testimony of Prof. Shields).
77
Id. at 224 (testimony of Prof. Shields), 228–29 (written statement of Prof. Shields,
describing his project as a “political communication study” rather than a “legal study”).
78
For a description of the search methodology and some of its limitations, see id. at 229–30
(written statement of Prof. Shields).
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those that did not. Shields focused on press and news reports because there is no
publicly available database of all federal investigations, but he also suggested that
the pattern of prosecutions publicized by the Department is independently
significant because of its political effects.79 Additionally, the Shields study seems
to imply that U.S. Attorneys chose the subjects of their investigations, though they
commonly rely upon referrals from investigating agencies, such as the F.B.I.80
Although the Shields study is flawed, using a different methodology that
avoids these problems, Sanford Gordon found evidence suggesting partisan bias in
prosecutions in both the Clinton and Bush Administrations.81 Gordon’s study,
though promising, is still a working paper.
2. Individual prosecutions
The House Judiciary Committee’s investigation into selective prosecution has
focused principally on allegations of partisan motives in five individual
prosecutions, though additional cases have also been referenced briefly.82 The two
most prominent cases are those of Don Siegelman and Georgia Thompson.
a. Don Siegelman
The first prosecution of former Alabama Governor Don Siegelman during the
Bush administration ended on the second day of trial, when the court dismissed the
case with prejudice.83 Siegelman was indicted in 2005 on new charges of federal
79

See id. at 228 (written statement of Prof. Shields, noting his project was originally intended
to be a “political communication study” rather than a “legal study”). However, it appears Shields
himself now views the study in a different light. He describes it as establishing the existence of
selective prosecution and proposes remedies to address selective prosecution. See id. at 234 (stating
that the statistics establish “that federal investigations and/or indictments of local officials are highly
disproportionate by political party” and that “this is clear proof of a political bias, a bias of selective
investigation and prosecution”), 234–36 (proposing various procedural remedies).
80
See Sanford C. Gordon, Assessing Partisan Bias in Federal Corruption Prosecutions 8
(July 21, 2008) (unpublished working paper) (concluding that Shields study is flawed by this
assumption, applying a methodology focusing on sentences in corruption cases, and finding evidence
of partisan bias under both the Bush II and Clinton Justice Departments, though noting that results
may understate extent of bias under Bush while overstating it under Clinton), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1166343.
81
Id. at 33 (applying a methodology focusing on sentencing in corruption cases, and finding
evidence of partisan bias under both the Bush II and Clinton Justice Departments).
82
See HOUSE STAFF REPORT, supra note 72, at 7–30 (describing in detail allegations
concerning Don Siegelman, Georgia Thompson, Dr. Cyril Wecht, Justice Oliver Diaz, and Paul
Minor), 30–33 (referring briefly to allegations concerning Senator Robert Menendez, Carl Marlinga,
State Senator Vince Fumo, and State Senator Charles Walker); House Hearing on Allegations of
Selective Prosecution, supra note 71, at 2–3 (materials concerning Minor and Diaz), 4–193 (materials
concerning Siegelman), 209–24 (materials concerning Wecht), 195–205 (materials concerning Anibal
Acevedo-Vilá, Senator Walker, Peter Palivos, and Geoffrey Fieger).
83
Siegelman Fraud Case Dismissed, HUNTSVILLE TIMES, Oct. 9, 2004, at 1A; Philip Rawls,
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funds bribery, honest services mail fraud, obstruction of justice, Hobbs Act
extortion under color of law, RICO violations, and related conspiracy charges.84
Most of the charges were based on contributions made by Richard Scrushy, the
former CEO of HealthSouth, to help fund a ballot initiative supported by
Siegelman that would establish a state lottery to fund secondary education in
Alabama.85 Scrushy provided two checks totaling $500,000 for this purpose to the
Alabama Education Lottery Foundation. The government charged that Siegelman
reappointed Scrushy to the Alabama Certificate of Need Review Board in
exchange for the contributions. Siegelman was convicted on seven counts of mail
fraud, federal program bribery, and obstruction, and sentenced to more than seven
years imprisonment.86 The government had advocated a sentence of thirty years87
and initially filed but later withdrew a cross appeal to challenge Siegelman’s
sentence as too lenient.88 Immediately following sentencing, Siegelman was taken
from the courtroom in handcuffs and leg irons to begin serving his sentence.89
Although the Eleventh Circuit ordered Siegelman’s release on bail pending the
completion of his appeal, it subsequently affirmed his conviction on five of the
seven counts.90

Hearing on Evidence Was Turning Point, MOBILE REG., Oct. 10, 2004, at B2.
84
See Second Superseding Indictment, United States v. Siegelman, No. 2:05-CR-119-F (M.D.
Ala. Dec. 12, 2005), available at http://www.al.com/mobileregister/DecemberIndictment.pdf.
Siegelman is charged in counts 1–3, 5–14, 16–17, and 34.
85
Compare Brief for the Appellee at 3, 5–18, United States v. Siegelman, No. 07-13163-B
(11th
Cir.)
[hereinafter
U.S.
Brief
in
Siegelman]
available
at
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/files/govt_brief.pdf (describing evidence
concerning Scrushy’s delivery of checks to Siegelman), with Brief for Appellant at 6–14, United
States v. Siegelman, No. 07-13163-B (11th Cir. May 2008) [hereinafter Siegelman brief], available
at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/files/seigelman_final_brief.pdf.
86
U.S. Brief in Siegelman, supra note 85, at 3–4 (detailing counts of conviction and sentence
of eighty-eight months imprisonment). Siegelman was acquitted of the remaining twenty-five counts.
87
House Hearing on Allegations of Selective Prosecution, supra note 71, at 9 (Statement of
Louis V. Franklin, Sr., Acting U.S. Attorney) (noting guideline calculation leading to guideline level
of 42, with a range of 360 months to life).
88
Kim Chandler, Prosecutors Quit Seeking Longer Terms For Siegelman, Scrushy,
BIRMINGHAM NEWS, June 5, 2008, at 6B, available at 2008 WLNR 10716488 (reporting that the
Government filed a motion withdrawing its appeal of the sentences as too lenient).
89
Id.
90
United States v. Siegelman, No. 0713163, 2009 WL 564659, at *6–11 (11th Cir. Mar. 6,
2009). See Editorial, Freedom for Siegelman, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Mar. 30, 2008, at 2, available at
2008 WLNR 6137779 (reporting that the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had ordered Siegelman’s
release on bail pending appeal nine months after he began serving his sentence and noting that the
standard for release on appeal was that the appeal raised “substantial questions of fact or law likely to
result in reversal or an order for a new trial”). See also Editorial, A Political Prosecution?, NAT’L
L.J., April 14, 2008, at 23 (noting a variety of circumstances about the case that raise “red flags” and
concluding that the court of appeals “seems justified” in granting Siegelman’s release pending
appeal).
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The criticism of the Siegelman prosecution generally focuses on two related
concerns: a claim that Siegelman was targeted by the Bush White House and U.S.
Attorney’s Office because he was a successful Democratic politician,91 and a
concern that the theory upon which the case was prosecuted is so broad that it
“would mean that a prosecutor has the power to indict and convict any politician
and any donor whenever a donation was made and the politician took an action
consistent with the donor’s desire.”92
Much of the criticism of the Siegelman prosecution rests on allegations that
the decision to prosecute Siegelman was improperly influenced by senior White
House adviser Karl Rove, working in tandem with the U.S. Attorneys in Alabama,
especially U.S. Attorney Leura Canary, whose husband worked on the campaign of
Siegelman’s opponent in the 2002 gubernatorial election. A participant in a call
involving U.S. Attorney Canary’s husband has stated under oath that Mr. Canary
assured the participants in the call that they need not worry about Siegelman
contesting the very close gubernatorial election, because the two U.S. Attorneys
“could take care of Siegelman,” and Karl Rove had arranged matters with the
Justice Department, which was “already pursuing Siegelman.”93 U.S. Attorney
Canary denies these charges, as do other participants in the call.94 Karl Rove
refused to testify before the House Judiciary Committee on July 10, 2008, about
his potential involvement in the Siegelman prosecution or U.S. Attorney firings.95
Related to this main claim are charges that Siegelman has been treated more
harshly than other similarly situated defendants.96
91

Siegelman was narrowly defeated in the gubernatorial election in 2002 after a controversy
about the final vote count. See Steve McConnell, The Changing of the Guards: Bay Minette, Election
Night,
BALDWIN
COUNTY
NOW,
July
20,
2007,
http://baldwincountynow.com/articles/2007/07/25/local_news/doc469fbb5bd2a7f444039407.txt.
92
Brief in Support of Appellant as Amici Curiae Former Attorneys General at 10, United
States v. Siegelman, No. 07-13163-B (11th Cir. May 30, 2008) [hereinafter Attorneys General
Amicus Brief in Siegelman].
93
House Hearing on Allegations of Selective Prosecution, supra note 71, at 168–93 (Jill
Simpson affidavit and supporting documentary evidence), 21–163 (Jill Simpson statement under
oath).
94
Ms. Canary publicly recused herself from the case, which was prosecuted by a career
attorney in her office. See House Hearing on Allegations of Selective Prosecution, supra note 71, at
5–9. The other participants, Rob Riley, Bill Canary, and Terry Butts all deny Simpson’s allegations.
Id. at 11–13 (affidavit of Robert Riley), 14–16 (affidavit of Matthew Lembke), 17–19 (affidavit of
Terry Butts).
95
See Memorandum from John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, to Members of the Committee on the
Judiciary (July 29, 2008) (recounting background of investigation, efforts to secure Rove’s voluntary
testimony, subpoena to Rove, and Rove’s refusal to appear), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/RoveMemo080730.pdf. See also RULING OF CHAIRWOMAN
LINDA SÁNCHEZ ON EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE-RELATED IMMUNITY CLAIMS BY KARL ROVE (2008),
available at http://judiciary.house.gov/news/PDFs/Sanchez080710.pdf. An agreement has reportedly
been reached for Rove to give deposition testimony under oath. See supra note 29.
96
For example, another former Alabama governor was convicted of corruption charges in a
case where he had personally benefitted, but he received a sentence of probation. House Hearing on
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The Siegelman prosecution has been the subject of widespread criticism. A
bipartisan group of forty-four former state attorneys general wrote to the House
and Senate Judiciary committees requesting a full investigation of the case,97
stating that “there is reason to believe that the case brought against Governor
Siegelman may have had sufficient irregularities as to call into question the basic
fairness that is the linchpin of our system of justice.”98 The case has been the
subject of exposés in media outlets ranging from CBS’s 60 Minutes99 to national
newspapers,100 and other popular periodicals including Time magazine101 and
Harper’s.102 The prosecution is also under investigation not only by Congress but
also by the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility.103
Although the main focus of concern has been on allegations that the
Siegelman prosecution was politically motivated and orchestrated by Karl Rove
and others, a second closely related concern has been raised most pointedly by a
bipartisan group of more than 50 former state attorneys general. In their amicus
Allegations of Selective Prosecution, supra note 71, at 292.
97
Id. at 290–93 (reprinting letter). See also Kim Chandler, House Panel to Probe Role of
Politics, BIRMINGHAM NEWS, July 18, 2007, at A1.
98
House Hearing on Allegations of Selective Prosecution, supra note 71, at 291.
99
See 60 Minutes: Did Ex-Alabama Governor Get A Raw Deal? (CBS television broadcast
Feb.
21,
2008),
available
at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/02/21/60minutes/main3859830.shtml.
100
See, e.g., Tom Hamburger, Panels Urged to Probe Ex-Gov.’s Prosecution: Forty-four
Former State Attorneys General Ask Congress to Examine the Federal Case Against an Alabama
Democrat, L.A. TIMES, July 17, 2007, at A8; Adam Nossiter, Democrats See Politics in a Governor’s
Jailing, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 2007, at A1; Adam Nossiter, Freed Ex-Governor of Alabama Talks of
Abuse of Power, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2008, at A13; Adam Nossiter, Where Politics Meet a Federal
Prosecution Investigating Case Against Ex-Governor, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 12, 2007, at 4,
available at 2007 WLNR 17821613; Politics Behind Ex-Governor’s Prosecution?, SEATTLE TIMES,
July 17, 2007, at A10; Probe Sought in Federal Prosecution: Politics at the Justice Department Are
Alleged In Case of Former Gov. Siegelman, HOUS. CHRON., July 17, 2007, at A5; Questions About a
Governor’s Fall, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2007, at A16.
101
Adam Zagorin, A Case of Selective Justice, TIME, Oct. 4, 2007,
http://www.time.com/time/printout/0,8816,1668453,00.html; Adam Zagorin, Rove Named in
Alabama
Controversy,
TIME,
June
1,
2007,
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1627427,00.html?iid=sphere-inline-sidebar.
102
Scott Horton, Vote Machine: How the Republicans Hacked the Justice Department,
HARPER’S MAG., March 2008, at 37, available at http://www.harpers.org/archive/2008/03/0081943.
103
See Letter from H. Marshall Jarrett, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Prof’l Responsibility
(OPR), to John Conyers, Jr., Chairman (May 5, 2008) (stating that OPR “currently has pending
investigations involving, among others, allegations of selective prosecution relating to the
prosecutions of Don Siegelman, Georgia Thompson, Oliver Diaz and Paul Minor”), available at
http://alt.cimedia.com/ajc/pdf/polinsider/050508%20response%20to%20report%20r.pdf;
Carrie
Johnson, House Panel Subpoenas Rove over Role in Justice Dept. Actions, WASH. POST, May 23,
2008, at A10 (stating House Judiciary Committee chairman John Conyers “disclosed yesterday that
the Justice Department’s Office of Professional Responsibility has opened an investigation of
possible selective prosecution of Siegelman and at least three others, at the request of the House
Judiciary panel”).
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brief in support of Siegelman’s appeal the former attorneys general express
concern that his prosecution was founded on a dangerously overbroad
interpretation of the mail/wire fraud and federal program bribery statutes that
“would have strong repercussions” going far beyond the particular case.104 The
court of appeals took a different view of the case, concluding that the district court
had correctly required a quid pro quo—though not an “express” quid pro quo—
and that the testimony of one of Siegelman’s former aides was sufficient to
establish such a quid pro quo for five of the seven counts on which he was
convicted.105
These claims are, of course, related, since interpreting the mail and wire fraud
statutes more broadly, without a requirement of an explicit quid pro quo, greatly
enhances the range of prosecutorial discretion in individual cases and hence the
danger that this discretion might be wielded in a partisan fashion.
b. Georgia Thompson
Georgia Thompson, a state procurement officer in Wisconsin, was convicted
of mail fraud and federal program bribery as a result of making slight deviations
from the procedures in state administrative code and awarding a contract to the low
bidder.106 Thompson was a civil service employee appointed during the
administration of the previous Republican governor.107 Although the winning
bidder had made campaign contributions to the Democratic governor, there was no
104

Attorneys General Amicus Brief in Siegelman, supra note 92, at 10. As explained in their

brief:
Allowing a conviction under either bribery or “honest services” statutes without an
explicit quid pro quo requirement . . . puts at risk every politician who accepts a
campaign contribution in the knowledge that the donor hopes to influence the politician,
and every donor who contributes to a campaign with the hope or expectation of receiving
a benefit who goes on to receive that benefit. Such an interpretation of the statutes,
criminalizing activities that fall far short of an explicit quid pro quo agreement, can only
lead to an impermissible chilling effect on the First Amendment right to contribute to
political campaigns.
Id.
105

United States v. Siegelman, No. 0713163, 2009 WL 564659, at *6–11 (11th Cir. Mar. 6,

2009).
106

United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 878 (7th Cir. 2007). Although the company that
ultimately received the contract had the highest combined score for price and service, an out-of-state
company scored very high on a “dog and pony show” presentation and had the highest combined
score. Id. After seeking to get her colleagues to change their ratings, Thompson employed a state
procedure allowing a “best-and-final” rebid, which led to scores of 1026.6 and 1027.3. Id. at 879.
With her supervisor’s consent, Thompson declared this a tie and awarded the contract to the in-state
bidder. Id. Although it is not clear precisely which provision of state law it contended had been
violated, the government’s theory was that “Thompson deflected the decision from the one that
should have been made under the administrative process.” Id. at 880.
107
Adam Cohen, A Woman Wrongly Convicted and a U.S. Attorney Who Kept His Job, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 16, 2007, at A18.

2009]

RETHINKING THE IDENTITY AND ROLE OF U.S. ATTORNEYS

389

evidence that Thompson knew of the contribution and no claim that she received
any benefit other than a $1,000 raise as part of her normal civil service review.108
At oral argument, Judge Diane Wood told the prosecutor the government’s
“evidence is beyond thin.”109 In an extremely unusual procedure, the Seventh
Circuit reversed Thompson’s conviction from the bench, declaring her “innocent”
and ordering her immediate release from prison.110 In a later opinion, the appellate
court concluded that the record at trial was fully consistent with innocent reasons
for Thompson’s support of the low bidder, including reducing costs and awarding
the contract to an in-state company.111 The court emphasized the danger in treating
any deviation from state laws or regulations as a federal crime, particularly in the
absence of any evidence that the employee in question received any kickback or
private gain, other than a raise awarded through the normal civil service process.112
The court concluded with the comment that Congress might wish to reconsider the
desirability of the wide-open language of the federal program bribery statute and
the “honest services” prong of the mail fraud statute:
Courts can curtail some effects of statutory ambiguity but cannot deal
with the source. This prosecution, which led to the conviction and
imprisonment of a civil servant for conduct that, as far as this record
shows, was designed to pursue the public interest as the employee
understood it, may well induce Congress to take another look at the
wisdom of enacting ambulatory criminal prohibitions.
Haziness
designed to avoid loopholes through which bad persons can wriggle can
impose high costs on people the statute was not designed to catch.113
Critics charge that Thompson’s prosecution was intended to provide a boost
to Republicans in hotly contested state elections. They allege that during the run
up to the 2006 gubernatorial campaign, the U.S. Attorney revealed the
investigation to the media despite Departmental norms against disclosure prior to
the filing of formal charges, and that Thompson’s trial and conviction then became
a major issue during the campaign.114 The Republican candidate ran a barrage of
108

Thompson, 484 F.3d at 879.
Jason Stein, Experts Say Ruling Hits Prosecutor’s Credibility, Court Makes It Clear That
U.S. Attorney Must Bring Much Stronger Cases in Fundraising Probes, WIS. STATE J., April 8, 2007,
http://www.madison.com/wsj/home/local/index.php?ntid=128460&ntpid=2 (quoting Judge Wood).
110
Id. (quoting former U.S. Attorney who could not recall any other case in four decades in
which Seventh Circuit had reversed from the bench and ordered the defendant released immediately).
111
The appellate court recognized there had been testimony that Thompson referred to
“political reasons” for the selection, but the court concluded this might have meant no more than
political pressure to keep costs down or award the contract to an in-state company. Thompson, 484
F.3d at 879–80.
112
Id. at 882–84.
113
Id. at 884.
114
Cohen, supra note 107, at A18.
109
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ads linking Thompson to Governor Jim Doyle, the incumbent Democrat. (One ad
showed Thompson’s photo stamped “guilty,” and another displayed her name on a
jail cell slamming shut.)115 The state Democratic Party Chair said that the
Thompson case became the number one issue in the governor’s race. Before and
after Thompson’s trial, prosecutors offered her generous plea concessions in
exchange for information and testimony against Governor Doyle or other
Democratic officials.116 Bush administration critics noted that Wisconsin was a
swing state, which Bush lost narrowly in 2000 and 2004, and that Karl Rove was
said to have identified it as the highest priority among the governor’s races in
2006.117
Some observers also suggested that there might be a link between the
Thompson prosecution and the firing of other U.S. Attorneys, because Steven
Biskupic, the U.S. Attorney who prosecuted Thompson, was on an early list of
those proposed for dismissal.118 The IG found that Biskupic’s name was on the
first list of U.S. Attorneys to be considered for removal in 2005 but was not
included in any of the lists in 2006.119 The concern, of course, is that U.S.
Attorneys whose jobs are on the line may face implicit or explicit pressure to use
their office to please their political superiors. Kyle Sampson, who compiled this
list, told the IG that he did not recall why he listed Biskupic, but he believed
Biskupic was removed from later lists to avoid the ire of Wisconsin Congressman
James Sensenbrenner.120 Biskupic told the IG that he was unaware that he was
ever considered for removal, and he denied discussing the Thompson case with
superiors at the Department.121 Similarly, Sampson said that other U.S. Attorneys
who might otherwise have been dismissed were left in office because the
Department wished to avoid a confrontation with their home-state senators.122
115

Id.
Ryan J. Foley, Doyle Rips Deal in Travel Case; Leniency Offered for Testimony, CAP.
TIMES (Madison, WI), May 18, 2007, at C2, available at 2007 WLNR 9441643 (noting that
Thompson was offered the opportunity before trial to plead to two misdemeanors and avoid jail, that
she repeatedly rejected such offers on the ground that she had no information about wrongdoing by
her superiors, and that prosecutors repeated their offers after trial, implicitly asking her to contradict
the testimony she had given under oath).
117
Cohen, supra note 107, at A18.
118
See, e.g., id. (noting Biskupic’s argument that Thompson sought to please her superiors and
enhance her job security might describe his motivation for prosecuting her); Editorial, Another Layer
of Scandal, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2007, at A16 (advocating Congressional investigation to determine
what Biskupic and other U.S. Attorneys did to escape being dismissed); Dan Eggen, Gonzales
Remains at Center of U.S. Attorneys Controversy, WASH. POST, April 18, 2007, available at 2007
WLNR 7340745 (noting connection between controversy over U.S. Attorney firings and Biskupic,
Republican complaints to the White House regarding Biskupic’s failure to prosecute voter fraud, and
Biskupic’s role in the prosecution of Georgia Thompson).
119
IG REPORT ON REMOVAL OF U.S. ATTORNEYS, supra note 2, at 18–20 & n.19.
120
Id. at 20 n.19.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 45 (Paula Silsby (District of Maine) and Thomas Marino (Middle District of
116
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II. THE HISTORY OF THE OFFICE OF U.S. ATTORNEY
The Department’s unusual structure—its exceptionally large number of
presidential appointees in regional offices—is rooted in its history. The Judiciary
Act of 1789 gave the authority to enforce federal law to the new federal judicial
districts, which generally coincided with the states. The attorney general was not
given supervisory authority over the new federal attorneys in each district, though
he played a role in a few prosecutions with national implications. This original
structure remains in place, but the attorney general has been given supervisory
authority over U.S. Attorneys, and more importantly the district-oriented structure
has been gradually supplemented by a second level of authority organized under
the attorney general. The Justice Department now includes subdivisions,
themselves headed by presidential appointees, which have responsibility for the
administration of criminal law. And the Department has promulgated an
increasing number of standards and regulations for federal prosecution. The
current organization of the Department is thus a hybrid, with the original districtoriented authority coinciding with the central authority wielded by the attorney
general and the attorneys housed in Main Justice, who work under the supervision
of the Department’s political leadership.
By the middle of the Twentieth Century, the attorney general had not only the
legal authority to exercise general supervision over the U.S. Attorneys, but also the
practical prerequisites of sufficient personnel as well as the means necessary to
keep appraised of developments in the field. In the past half century there has been
a significant centralization of authority. A variety of initiatives have been adopted
to regulate prosecutorial discretion at the national level for the stated purpose of
promoting consistency and avoiding abuse. These initiatives have considerably
reduced the autonomy of individual U.S. Attorneys. But the movement toward
centralization and uniformity has not wholly displaced the U.S. Attorneys, who
continue to wield considerable authority. The preservation of the authority of the
U.S. Attorneys owes something to the weight of tradition and the determined
resistance of current and past U.S. Attorneys. But it also reflects a more general
recognition that the dispersal of authority has continuing value in the federal
system. Congress has had its thumb on both sides of the scale, sometimes
acquiescing in and supporting decentralization and independence in the U.S.
Attorneys’ Offices, but in other instances pressing for uniformity, particularly with
respect to sentencing practices. During some periods, Congress has been
extremely skeptical of Main Justice. Practical factors have also played a role. The
development of the central authority in Main Justice has been offset, to a degree,
by changes in the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, which now have larger staffs including
more experienced attorneys.

Pennsylvania) were deleted from the list for removal because they had the strong support of their
home-state senators and the administration did not want to risk a fight regarding their removal).
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The modern era has also been characterized by fundamental changes in the
nature of the federal criminal justice system that magnify the importance of
prosecutorial discretion. The system has expanded to a degree that would be
unimaginable to the founders. There are now more than 4,000 federal offenses,
and federal law now occupies much of the same ground as state law. Because the
scope of federal law is so broad, federal prosecutors can charge only a tiny fraction
of the offenses, and they necessarily exercise discretion in selecting those cases.
Moreover, some of the key federal offenses are themselves broad and amorphous,
giving federal prosecutors another form of discretion that is especially significant
in cases involving allegations of political corruption at the state and local level.
These cases now fall within the expanded federal system. Finally, because fewer
than five percent of the cases go to trial, in most cases that end with a guilty plea
there is no external check on the prosecutor’s discretion. Federal prosecution has
been transformed into an administrative system.
Despite the many changes that have occurred in the role of the U.S. Attorneys
and the makeup of the federal criminal justice system, there has been little change
in the patterns of the appointment and removal of U.S. Attorneys. This stability
reflects the fact that the traditional system creates valuable patronage opportunities
and increases the influence of both the president and the Senate, and it has
generally been deemed to be working successfully.
A. Autonomy During the Founding Period
The Judiciary Act of 1789 established the federal district courts and the
positions of the judge, marshal, and attorney for the United States in each of the
new districts, as well as the position of attorney general.123 Like the attorney
general, the new federal attorneys and marshals in each district were appointed by
the president with the advice and consent of the Senate.124 This structure reflected
a respect for the states as distinct communities. The districts coincided with state
boundaries except for separate districts in the portions of Massachusetts and
123
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 2 (creating federal judicial districts), § 3 (creating district
court in each district to consist of judge who shall reside in the district), § 27 (providing for
appointment of marshal in each district who shall serve for term of four years but be removable from
office at pleasure of president), § 35 (providing for appointment in each district of an attorney for the
United States as well as “attorney-general for the United States”), 1 Stat. 73, 87, 92 (1789). For
many years the attorneys representing the United States in each district were generally referred to as
“district attorneys,” though that phrase does not appear in the Act. For purposes of this article, I will
generally use the contemporary phrase U.S. Attorney(s).
124
Although the Judiciary Act of 1789 did not expressly identify the appointing authority, it
was and has been treated as referring the president’s power to appoint inferior officers under Article
II. See Griffin B. Bell & Daniel J. Meador, Appointing United States Attorneys, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 247,
248–49 (1993) (“In the absence of any congressional enactment on the subject, the existing
appointment process functions directly under Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, which provides
that the President shall nominate and, with the ‘advice and consent’ of the Senate, appoint inferior
officers.”).
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Virginia that would later become the new states of Maine and Kentucky.125 This
structure was consistent with the founders’ concern for ensuring that a person
charged with a crime should be tried in the district where the crime was committed
by a jury drawn by the residents of that district.126
The first Congress declined to give the attorney general the authority to
supervise the U.S. Attorneys,127 and it made them financially independent of the
central government. Their compensation was to be based upon “such fees as shall
be taxed therefore in the respective courts before which the suits or prosecutions
shall be.”128 However, during the first eighty years, some institutional authority
over the U.S. Attorneys rested with various federal agencies, including the
Departments of State129 and Treasury,130 which had an interest, for example, in the
collection of revenues.
During this period, the attorney general did not closely supervise the actions
of the federal attorneys in each district, although he supervised and even appeared
in a few criminal cases of great national significance.131 Indeed, a leading scholar
125

Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 2 (creating federal judicial districts).
Charles F.C. Ruff, Federal Prosecution of Local Corruption: A Case Study in the Making
of Law Enforcement Policy, 65 GEO. L.J. 1171, 1205 (1977) (citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, and
amend. VI).
127
Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme:
In the Beginning There Was Pragmatism, 1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 585–89 (1989) (noting that the first
Attorney General, Edmund Randolph, sought statutory authority to manage federal prosecutions with
the backing of President Washington, but Congress refused even to require district attorneys to notify
the Attorney General about litigation).
128
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 92–93 (1789). In contrast, the attorney general’s
compensation was to “be by law provided,” i.e., set by Congress. Id.
129
See Bloch, supra note 127, at 585–86 (“Indeed, many observers believed that Secretary of
State Jefferson had more control over the district attorneys than Attorney General Randolph had.”);
Harold J. Krent, Executive Control Over Criminal Law Enforcement: Some Lessons From History, 38
AM. U. L. REV. 275, 287 (1989) (“During President Washington’s administration, the Secretary of
State evidently assumed titular responsibility for supervising the district attorneys, although that
supervision was lax.”).
130
Act of May 29, 1830, ch. 153, § 5, 4 Stat. 415 (1830) (authorizing the Solicitor of the
Treasury “to instruct the district attorneys . . . in all matters and proceedings, appertaining to suits in
which the United States is a party, or interested, and cause them . . . to report to him from time to
time, any information he may require in relation to the same.”). One knowledgeable observer also
states that “in the early days,” when there was no centralized control, the federal district attorneys and
marshals “were chiefly directed by the district judges, who themselves were subject to few rules of
procedure and ran their courts pretty much as they pleased.” LUTHER A. HUSTON, THE DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE 65 (1967).
131
In the early 1790s the attorney general participated actively in a test case charging a U.S.
citizen who had aided French privateers with violating the neutrality laws and in the prosecution of
cases arising out of the Whiskey Rebellion. HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL
JUSTICE 30–31, 43–45 (1937) (describing Attorney General Randoph’s attendance at circuit court to
secure initial indictments, the use of the military to put down the rebellion after efforts at conciliation
failed, and the trial of the resulting cases by the attorney general and the federal district attorney). In
both cases, the attorney general and the federal district attorney tried the cases together. Indeed, in
126

394

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol 6:369

has concluded that Congress deliberately “withheld the means necessary to enable
the Executive to coordinate effective control over criminal law enforcement.”132
Until the Civil War, the Attorney General’s office was “basically a one-man
operation.”133 In 1817, for example, the new attorney general found that he had no
office in Washington, no clerical assistance, and there were virtually no files or
other records from his predecessors, many of whom resided outside of Washington
and discharged their official duties by mail.134 Until 1850, Congress provided the
Attorney General with only one clerk.135 The first full time attorney general, and
the first to reside full time in Washington, took office in 1853.136 In any event,
even if the Attorney General had been given more resources, it would have been
impossible to provide close supervision because there were no quick means of
travel to or communication with the U.S. Attorneys, who were dispersed
throughout the nation. The circumstances thus required the U.S. Attorneys in each
district to act with a great deal of independence.
There were, however, two countervailing factors that constrained the range of
discretion the U.S. Attorneys exercised in criminal cases. First, during this period
the new federal government was small and the number of federal crimes very
restricted, generally focusing on direct interference with federal programs,
property, or officials.137 Second, the Supreme Court limited federal prosecutors to

rare circumstances early presidents issued orders to their district attorneys. For example, George
Washington encouraged prosecutions of tax dissenters during the Whiskey Rebellion in 1792. See
Saikrishna Prakash, The Chief Prosecutor, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 553–63 (2005) (citing
Proclamation of Sept. 15, 1792, in 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 150–51 (John C.
Fitzpatrick ed., United States Government Printing Press 1931)), for discussion of the involvement of
Presidents George Washington, John Adams, and Thomas Jefferson in prosecutions by federal
district attorneys.
132
Krent, supra note 129, at 289.
133
JAMES EISENSTEIN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNITED STATES: U.S. ATTORNEYS IN THE POLITICAL
AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 10 (1978).
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
PREVENTING IMPROPER INFLUENCE ON FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES: A REPORT
OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES 33 (1976) [hereinafter PREVENTING IMPROPER INFLUENCE].
137
For brief accounts of the early scope of federal criminal jurisdiction, see LISA L. MILLER,
THE PERILS OF FEDERALISM: RACE, POVERTY, AND THE POLITICS OF CRIME CONTROL 30–32 (2008),
and Sara Sun Beale, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA CRIME & JUST. 694, 694–95
(2nd ed. 2002).
The principal antebellum federal crimes were (1) acts threatening the existence of the
central government, such as treason; (2) misconduct by federal officers, such as
acceptance of a bribe; (3) interference with the operation of the federal courts, such as
perjury; and (4) interference with other governmental programs, including obstruction of
the mails, theft of government property, revenue fraud, and bribery or obstruction of
government personnel.
Id. at 695.
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the small number of crimes enacted by Congress, holding that there are no federal
common law offenses.138
B. Supervisory Authority and the Creation of the Department
By the time of the Civil War, Congress was receptive to placing greater
authority and resources in the attorney general, balancing the authority given to the
federal attorneys in each district with central authority. Although both Congress
and the Attorney General made structural changes affecting the U.S. Attorneys
immediately before and after the Civil War, the effect of these changes was limited
for many years by practical constraints.
The Attorney General was first given supervisory authority over the U.S.
Attorneys in 1861,139 and in 1870 Congress created the Department of Justice and
incorporated the U.S. Attorneys into the new department.140 The 1870 legislation
granted the Attorney General “supervision of the conduct and proceedings of the
various attorneys for the United States” and required the new U.S. Attorneys to
make reports on their activities.141 Many departments had secured their own
solicitors, and many special counsel had been appointed to conduct individual
cases. The creation of the department was intended to reduce expenditures by
bringing these functions together under the supervision of the attorney general.142
In order to bring to light any irregular practices, fraud, or abuse, the attorney
general employed “examiners” to investigate the accounts and the conduct of cases
by the federal district attorneys, and some cases of neglect of duty were
reported.143
The effect of the new statutory authority, however, was limited for many
years by both the practical constraints imposed by geography as well as the
tradition of U.S. Attorney autonomy.144 Writing of the period immediately before
and after the Civil War, Attorney General Homer Cummings stated that the U.S.
Attorneys “remained all but completely independent.”145 James Eisenstein notes
138

See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 32, 34 (1812).
Act of August 2, 1861, ch. 37, § 1, 12 Stat. 285 (1861) (granting the Attorney General
“general superintendence and direction of the attorneys and marshals of all the districts in the United
States and the Territories as to the manner of discharging their respective duties”).
140
Department of Justice Act of 1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (1870).
141
Id. § 16.
142
LUTHER A. HUSTON ET AL., ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 8 (1968). See also
CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 131, at 218–25.
143
CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 131, at 248. See id. at 493–94 (noting severe
problems caused by the fee system, which created very undesirable incentives).
144
Bell & Meador, supra note 124, at 248 (noting that “[t]he tradition of U.S. Attorney
autonomy had become deeply entrenched before 1870” and attributing part of this entrenched
autonomy to American geography and “the remoteness from Washington of the ninety-four U.S.
Attorneys”).
145
CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 131, at 218.
139
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that during this period “[t]he attorney general had little time for supervision of U.S.
Attorneys, and some felt it was improper for him to attempt it.”146 On the other
hand, various attorneys general did instruct the U.S. Attorneys in some high
priority cases,147 including the prosecution of violence in the South during the
Reconstruction era.148
In 1910, the Attorney General created a new internal organizational structure
for the Department, assigning Assistant Attorneys General to head departments
with responsibility for different fields of public law.149 These divisions were
complemented by other units whose function was defined not by subject matter but
by the stage or function of the process.150 This structure made it possible for the
146

EISENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 235 n.36. Former Attorney General Cummings described
the situation as follows:
President Pierce had attempted to route departmental law business through the Attorney
General, but even then, when called upon, the Attorney General acted merely as an
adviser. Black, who succeeded Cushing, believed it wrong to “interfere” with the
management of cases in the trial courts and repeatedly refused requests, though he
acknowledged a “sort of supervisory power” over the general subject. Attorney General
Bates denied himself all authority or responsibility for such cases.
CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 131, at 218. Cushing and Black served from 1853–57 and
1857–60, respectively, which was before the enactment of the statutory authority for supervision.
HUSTON, supra note 130, at 252; CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 131. Bates, who served from
1861–64, held office after the enactment of the initial supervisory legislation. Id.
147
For example, the attorney general prepared lengthy instructions for the new U.S. Attorney
for the Utah territory concerning the prosecution of Mormon polygamy. CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND,
supra note 131, at 253. The largely unsuccessful investigation and prosecution of fraud concerning
the contracts for delivery of mail on “star routes” in sparsely settled areas of the West was
orchestrated by the attorney general and postmaster general and then carried out by special counsel
selected by them with some participation by the attorney general. Id. at 253–60 (noting that the
original counsel selected by the attorney general and postmaster general included a former federal
district attorney from New York, and that the attorney general followed the first prosecution very
closely and presented the closing argument himself).
148
The attorney general was involved in some of the criminal prosecutions arising out of
violence in southern states during the Reconstruction period. Local U.S. Attorneys called upon the
attorney general and other officials in Washington to provide military assistance to quell violence or
maintain order, and to provide more resources to support prosecutions. See, e.g., id. at 235 (request
for federal troops and funds to hire special counsel). The attorney general responded to these
enquiries, and in some cases also provided specific instructions to the U.S. Attorneys regarding the
actions to be taken in particular prosecutions. See, e.g., id. at 237 (attorney general instructs federal
district attorney in North Carolina to resist efforts to have judgments suspended in prosecution of Ku
Klux Klan members), id. at 238 (attorney general directs dismissal of all charges in N.C. except “high
crime” over protest of district attorney), id. at 240 (warning U.S. Attorney in South Carolina, who
had 1,000 cases pending, that this could not continue because of the expense), id. at 241–45 (after
Colfax Massacre in Louisiana, the Department sent an investigator to develop facts that led to
indictment of ninety-six persons, and later after Justice Bradley, while riding circuit, granted motion
in arrest of judgment based on narrow reading of the act, attorney general agreed prosecutions should
be suspended until Supreme Court ruled on theory underlying most of the civil rights prosecutions).
149
Id. at 496–97.
150
Id. For example, the Solicitor General was given responsibility for all government interests
in the Supreme Court as well as control over all the decision whether to appeal in the lower courts.

2009]

RETHINKING THE IDENTITY AND ROLE OF U.S. ATTORNEYS

397

Department to deal more efficiently with the growth in the number and complexity
of legal issues arising under federal law.
The Criminal Division was established in 1928 to supervise the administration
of federal criminal law.151 In 1933, Attorney General Cummings assigned thirtyone functions to the Criminal Division, including responsibility for the federal
prohibition laws.152 The new structure did not, however, displace the U.S.
Attorneys who continued to be responsible for litigation in their districts.153 Upon
occasion, however, the Division was given a more active role. For example, the
Attorney General created a special unit during World War II to deal with warrelated frauds against the government, which functioned through a central office
and field office within the Criminal Division.154
C. The Modern Era
The advent of modern communication and transportation eventually removed
many of the practical barriers to controlling the widely dispersed and locallyoriented U.S. Attorneys, thus paving the way for a reconsideration of the issue of
the optimal distribution of federal law enforcement authority. This period has been
characterized by a movement toward centralized authority and greater uniformity
that has coincided uneasily with a continued recognition of the traditional authority
of the U.S. Attorneys.
This shift in the balance between centralized and locally based authority has
been taking place during a time of fundamental changes in the nature of the federal
criminal justice system that magnify the importance of prosecutorial discretion. As
discussed in greater degree below, the extraordinary expansion in the scope of
federal criminal law now requires federal prosecutors to exercise discretion in
determining which of many possible cases to bring, and it gives them an
unprecedented ability to reach allegations of political corruption at the state and
local level. New sentencing laws have also given federal prosecutors increased
leverage in plea negotiations, and judicial oversight has been radically reduced
because the vast majority of cases now end in a plea. In effect, federal prosecution
has been transformed into an administrative system, and federal prosecutors wield
tremendous discretion within that system.
Id. at 497.
151
HUSTON, supra note 130, at 188–89.
152
Id. at 190–91.
153
The Criminal Division did not displace the U.S. Attorneys but was given the responsibility
of “supervision,” which involved some counseling and advising them. See, e.g., 1942 ATTORNEY
GENERAL ANNUAL REPORT 90 (recognizing that the U.S. Attorney has the “primary responsibility . . .
for the proper administration of the law in his district” but stating that the Criminal Division
“supervision” of the U.S. Attorneys frequently requires the division to “advise and counsel with
him”). Similar statements are found in the Attorney General’s annual reports for other years. See,
e.g., 1930 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 36.
154
1944 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 9.
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1. Power shifts—unevenly—to Washington as the Department enters the
modern era
By the middle of the Twentieth Century, a good deal of power had shifted to
Main Justice, though there was substantial variation in the autonomy retained by
individual districts.155 In addition to improved technology, the relatively small size
of most U.S. Attorneys’ Offices facilitated departmental control during this
period,156 as did high turnover rates and the limited experience of AUSAs.
Because AUSAs were not well compensated and lacked job security, their tenure
and expertise were generally quite limited.157 The lack of in-house manpower and
expertise made U.S. Attorneys’ Offices dependent on Main Justice to take over
complex, time-consuming cases or send attorneys from Washington.158
The Department also took formal steps to regulate the U.S. Attorneys and to
eliminate some of their authority. In 1953, the Department established the
Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys and promulgated the first version of the U.S.
Attorneys’ Manual, which was a comprehensive set of formal instructions.159 In
1966, the attorney general created the organized crime strike forces, which
eventually expanded to have offices in scores of cities.160 The strike force
attorneys reported directly to the Department, not to the local U.S. Attorney, and
they were seen as a serious blow to the autonomy of the U.S. Attorneys and their
control of federal law enforcement in their districts.161 The tension between strike
forces and U.S. Attorneys’ Offices was well known, and the strain was especially
pronounced in districts with the greatest tradition of autonomy.162
When James Eisenstein completed the field research for his classic study
Counsel for the United States in the 1970s, he found the relationship between Main
Justice and individual U.S. Attorneys’ Offices to be in flux.163 There were
155

EISENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 10–11.
Id. at 5 (noting that in 1968 almost half of USAOs had four or fewer AUSAs, and by 1975
more than half still had only four to ten AUSAs).
157
Eisenstein, The U.S. Attorney Firings, supra note 66, at 231.
158
Id.
159
EISENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 10.
160
For a description of the development of the strike forces and their organization, see Note,
The Strike Force: Organized Law Enforcement v. Organized Crime, 6 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS.
496, 509–21 (1970).
161
See EISENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 90 (describing the removal of cases from the U.S.
Attorneys by mechanisms such as the strike forces as the biggest long term threat to the autonomy of
the U.S. Attorneys and noting that the autonomy of the offices that were least successful in resisting
the strike forces was “significantly eroded”).
162
See Ruff, supra note 126, at 1205–06 (noting the exacerbation of the “strain between the
Department and the field” resulting from actions of strike forces “in some federal districts that
historically have had the most independent and well-staffed United States Attorneys’ Offices”).
163
EISENSTEIN, supra note 66, at 231 (“The confluence of the multiple factors shaping
headquarters and field interactions produced four distinct patterns: ‘normal,’ ‘controlled or ideal,’
156
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significant differences in the degree of autonomy accorded to the various U.S.
Attorneys’ Offices. Some U.S. Attorneys’ Offices were operating as “ideal field
offices” with little independence, but a few others were “semi-autonomous.”164
Having a larger number of experienced AUSAs enabled some U.S. Attorneys’
Offices to end their reliance on Main Justice for manpower and expertise.165 For
example, the Southern District of New York, with almost seventy AUSAs, rarely
ceded cases to attorneys from Main Justice.166
2. Federal law enforcement changes dramatically
By 1970, the federal criminal justice system was undergoing a profound series
of changes, which inevitably influenced the role of the U.S. Attorneys and their
relationship to Main Justice. Criminal law became a hot button political issue in
the late 1960s, serving as a focal point in presidential and congressional election
campaigns.167 Federal criminal law expanded in every sense.168 New federal
criminal statutes proliferated. In 1998, an American Bar Association Task Force
on the Federalization of Crime found that more than forty percent of the federal
criminal laws enacted since the Civil War had been passed in a period of roughly
twenty-five years, between 1970 and 1998.169 Another study found that there was
over a one-third increase in federal offenses carrying criminal penalties between
1980 and 2004.170 It is now impossible to say exactly how many federal offenses
there are, but the best estimate is that there are more than four thousand.171
‘conflict,’ and ‘semi-autonomous.’”).
164
Id. at 232.
165
Id. at 236.
166
See id. at 232.
167
See generally Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do With It? The Political, Social,
Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal
Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 32–44 (1997).
168
For a discussion of some of the implications of this growth, see generally Sara Sun Beale,
The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54
AM. U. L. REV. 747 (2005).
169
James A. Strazzella, The Federalization of Criminal Law: Task Force on the Federalization
of Criminal Law, 1998 A.B.A. SEC. CRIM. JUST. 7.
170
JOHN S. BAKER, JR. & DALE E. BENNETT, MEASURING THE EXPLOSIVE GROWTH OF FEDERAL
CRIME
LEGISLATION
8
(Federalist
Society
ed.,
2004),
at
http://www.fedsoc.org/doclib/20070404_crimreportfinal.pdf.
171
Id. at 4–9. There are several difficulties in getting an accurate count. Because multiple
crimes are typically stated in the same section of a statute, it can be very difficult to determine how
many different offenses are actually created by a single statute. See id. at 7–8. Another problem is
finding all of the relevant statutes. Although many criminal statutes are gathered in Title 18 of the
U.S. Code, the remainder are scattered throughout the other 50 titles, which encompass more than
27,000 pages. Ronald K. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Past and Future, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L.
REV. 45, 53 (1998). Many of these statutory provisions incorporate by reference administrative
regulations (and may punish as crimes, for example, willful violations). According to American Bar
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Federal law now overlaps very substantially with state law, reaching at least
some instances of many state offenses, including theft, fraud, extortion, bribery,
assault, domestic violence, robbery, murder, weapons offenses, and drug
offenses.172 There are also many more defendants in the federal system. The
number of criminal cases and defendants in the federal system has increased very
rapidly. The federal criminal caseload has roughly doubled in the last twenty-five
years.173 Given the limited resources in the federal system, even this increased
number of federal cases represents only a fraction of the defendants whose conduct
could have been prosecuted under federal law. The mismatch between the broad
scope of federal criminal law and the relatively narrow scope of federal resources
requires federal prosecutors to select a small fraction of cases to prosecute in
federal court, leaving the remainder to be prosecuted under state law. As I have
argued elsewhere, the federal prosecutor’s choice has profound consequences for
defendants. Prosecuting a case under federal rather than state law generally
subjects a defendant to a much harsher sentence for the same conduct,174 and the
defendant may also be deprived of procedural protections that would be available
under state law.175
Key federal offenses have also been given an expansive interpretation, leaving
their outer boundaries not only broad, but ill-defined. This is particularly true of
the main offenses used to prosecute political corruption at the state and local level:
mail fraud, Hobbs Act extortion under color of official right, and federal program
bribery.176 Georgia Thompson and Don Siegelman were charged with these
offenses.177 The broad interpretation of these statutes, first advanced in
Association, there are almost 10,000 such administrative regulations that may be subject to criminal
enforcement. Strazella, supra note 169, at 10.
172
See Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the Proper
Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 997–98 (1995).
173
The United States commenced 32,682 criminal cases in 1982 and 35,872 in 1983. BUREAU
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS: ONLINE,
tbl.5.8.2007, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t582007.pdf (last visited Feb. 20,
2008). In 2007, it commenced 68,413. Id. It should be noted, however, that fluctuations in the
federal caseload are not new. The peak was more than 92,000 cases during Prohibition, as an
avalanche of small cases hit the federal courts, and increases in the caseload in the 1990s brought the
numbers back to the same rate as the early 1970s. See Beale, supra note 172, at 984 n.19 (describing
caseload fluctuation); cf. Sara Sun Beale, The Unintended Consequences of Enhancing Gun
Penalties: Shooting Down the Commerce Clause and Arming Federal Prosecutors, 51 DUKE L.J.
1641, 1646–48 (2002) (suggesting a positive political theory explanation for United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995), as a manifestation of the Supreme Court’s concern that the federal courts would
be flooded with criminal cases and become low status “police courts”).
174
Beale, supra note 168, at 761–65.
175
Id. at 768–69. It is, however, also possible that in some cases state law may provide greater
protections than federal law.
176
For a general discussion of the breadth of these offenses, see NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA
SUN BEALE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 160–328 (4th ed. 2006).
177
See supra text accompanying notes 84–122.
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prosecutions brought by U.S. Attorneys,178 exponentially increased the power of
federal prosecutors, giving them an entirely new form of discretion to formulate
standards of good government and to apply them retroactively to state and local
officials.179
The last two ingredients in the contemporary federal system are the nearly
complete shift to an administrative system, rather than an adversarial trial-focused
system, and the adoption of national sentencing guidelines and laws imposing
harsher sentences. Each of these two changes is significant, and they are even
more powerful in tandem. More than ninety percent of all federal convictions are
now obtained by a guilty plea.180 In 2004 there were only 3,346 federal criminal
trials, though more than 83,000 federal defendants’ cases were concluded.181 In
contrast to the traditional expectation that the prosecutor will be subject to multiple
checks in an adversarial process that ends in a public jury trial supervised by an
independent judge, an administrative system of criminal justice has emerged.182
Federal prosecutors plea bargain with the advantage of both the broad jurisdiction
available under federal law and the leverage that flows from the harsh federal

178
See Ruff, supra note 126, at 1205–06 (noting that the U.S. Attorney who advanced the
innovative interpretation of the Hobbs Act did so in violation of two different sections of the U.S.
Attorneys’ Manual).
179
See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone
to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 163–70, 187–99 (1994) (describing the development
of the intangible rights doctrine in lower court decisions and its adoption by Congress in 18 U.S.C. §
1346 and arguing that it renders the mail fraud act unconstitutionally vague); Gregory Howard
Williams, Good Government By Prosecutorial Decree: The Use and Abuse of Mail Fraud, 32 ARIZ.
L. REV. 137 (1990). Noting the perception that there is a Hobson’s choice “between enacting a
specific statute that may be circumvented or a vague statute that is subject to selective enforcement,”
Professor Moohr observes that “[s]ince the late 1970s, law enforcement officials, the judiciary, and,
in their turn, legislators, have chosen the latter option.” Moohr, supra, at 156.
For cases considering vagueness challenges, see United States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92 (2d
Cir. 2002) (holding honest services provision of mail fraud act unconstitutionally vague as applied),
overruled by United States v. Rybicki, 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
180
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2007 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, fig. C
(2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2007/FigC.pdf (showing that in FY 2007, 95.8%
of convictions were obtained by guilty plea and 4.2% were obtained by trial).
181
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS ONLINE, tbl.5.17.2004, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t5172004.pdf
(including bench and jury trials for defendants convicted and acquitted).
182
Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
2117, 2118 (1998).
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sentencing laws.183 In effect, federal prosecutors may exercise both adjudicative
and lawmaking authority.184
3. More changes in the relationship between Main Justice and the U.S.
Attorneys’ Offices
Following nationwide trends, the attorney general and the political leadership
of the Department focused increasing attention on the regulation of prosecutorial
behavior in order to promote uniformity and define departmental policies and
priorities.185 The Attorney General promulgated the Principles of Federal
Prosecution in 1980.186 The Principles of Federal Prosecution speak in general
terms, but they are supplemented by the now massive U.S. Attorneys Manual,
which includes more than 200 provisions that require prior approval, consultation,
or notification.187 These initiatives have had the effect of reducing the autonomy
of individual U.S. Attorneys. For example, concerns regarding the potential for
disparity in the administration of the federal death penalty led to the adoption of a
procedure in which the Attorney General makes the determination whether to seek
the death penalty, and bases this determination on the recommendation of a Capital
183

Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1409, 1415 (2003) (noting that “the increased severity of federal sentences, coupled with the wide
discretion in charges available to the federal prosecutor on a single set of facts” has depressed the
federal trial rate to an unprecedented level). Wright and Miller have recommended that plea
bargaining be limited to avoid abuse. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining
Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29 (2002) (advocating aggressive screening of cases and limits on precharge bargaining). But see Gerard E. Lynch, Screening Versus Plea Bargaining: Exactly What Are
We Trading Off?, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1399, 1405 n.9 (2003) (arguing that the presence of a
“meaningful opportunity” for trial serves as a check on prosecutorial overreaching).
184
See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 509 (2001) (“As criminal law expands, both lawmaking and adjudication pass into the hands of
police and prosecutors; law enforcers, not the law, determine who goes to prison and for how long.”).
185
The scholarship of Kenneth Culp Davis, an administrative law scholar who argued in favor
of subjecting prosecutorial discretion to regulation and review, was instrumental in generating
interest on the part of both scholars and policy makers in the regulation of prosecutorial discretion.
See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY (1969). For
an early discussion of the application of Davis’s theories to the Department of Justice, see Norman
Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REV. 1
(1971).
186
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION (1980), reprinted in
substantial part in 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 317 (1994). The current version of the PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL PROSECUTION is included in the USAM, supra note 26, §§ 9-27.001 to .760, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/27mcrm.htm. For a discussion of
the promulgation of the PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION and other related policy directives, see
Daniel J. Freed & Marc Miller, Guiding the Discretion of U.S. Attorneys: Department of Justice
Policies, 1980–1994, in 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 299 (1994). There were earlier, more specific
prosecutorial guidelines. See Abrams, supra note 185, at 22–23, 25–26 (discussing guidelines for
postal obscenity and criminal libel cases and federal-state prosecutions).
187
USAM, supra note 26, at § 9-2.400 (Prior Approvals Chart).
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Review Committee at Main Justice and the recommendation of the Deputy
Attorney General, to whom the committee reports.188 This process has been
controversial because the Attorney General may not only decline to seek the death
penalty despite the support of the U.S. Attorney, but may also override the U.S.
Attorney in cases where they recommend against seeking the death penalty.189
Approval is required before charges may be brought under a variety of
criminal statutes. For example, U.S. Attorneys must seek the approval of Main
Justice before filing criminal RICO charges and certain types of money laundering
charges.190 The Department also limits the U.S. Attorneys’ ability to advance
novel claims under any criminal statute by requiring the approval of the Solicitor
General before the filing of any appeal or petition for certiorari.191
Prior approval is also required before taking a wide variety of procedural
steps, including moving for or consenting to the closing of a judicial proceeding,
requesting the disclosure of grand jury materials to state or local law enforcement
officials, or issuing a subpoena to members of the news media, officers of a foreign
bank or corporation temporarily in the U.S., or persons or entities in the U.S. for
records located abroad.192 Approval is required before requesting immunity or
initiating the prosecution of an immunized person.193 In the area of corporate
investigations, the Department moved from a 1999 policy that gave a high degree
of deference to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices in determining what aspects of corporate
cooperation to consider in making charging decisions, to one in which consultation
with Main Justice was required before prosecutors could seek waivers of a

188

USAM, supra note 26, at § 9-10.050. See generally Rory K. Little, The Federal Death
Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the Department of Justice’s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
347, 440 (1999).
189
See, e.g., John Gleeson, Supervising Federal Capital Punishment: Why the Attorney
General Should Defer When U.S. Attorneys Recommend Against the Death Penalty, 89 VA. L. REV.
1697 (2003); Richman, supra note 61, at 1393. See also William Glaberson, Ashcroft’s Push For
Execution Voids Plea Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2003, at A1 (noting Ashcroft had ordered the death
penalty in twenty-one cases against the recommendation of the U.S. Attorney in question, and that
such cases place the U.S. Attorney and AUSAs who must then prosecute the case in a difficult
position).
190
USAM, supra note 26, §§ 9-110.010 to .900 (RICO procedures); id. § 9-105.300(4)
(requiring Criminal Division approval before charging a financial institution with money laundering
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957); id. §§ 9-105.300(4), 9-105.600 (requiring approval of Assistant
Attorney General of the Criminal Division before indicting attorney for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957
where the criminally derived property is or purports to be fees paid to the attorney for representation).
Pre-approval is also required in some civil rights and economic espionage prosecutions. Daniel C.
Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA
L. REV. 757, 802 (1999).
191
USAM, supra note 26, § 9-2.170. See also 28 C.F.R. § 0.20(b) (2008) (giving the Solicitor
General the authority to determine whether and to what extent appeals will be taken by the
government in any case).
192
USAM, supra note 26, §§ 9-5.150, 9-11.260, 9-13.400, 9-13.525.
193
Id. §§ 9-23.130, 9-23.400.
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corporation’s attorney client privilege, to the current policy generally forbidding
prosecutors from seeking such waivers.194
The broadest restriction on the discretion of local prosecutors came in the
wake of the adoption of the federal Sentencing Guidelines. The adoption of the
Sentencing Reform Act and the promulgation of the sentencing guidelines
provided both a rationale and a mechanism for much greater control from
Washington of core functions in every U.S. Attorney’s Office.195 Reasoning that
inconsistent prosecutorial charging practices could undermine the sentencing
uniformity Congress sought to achieve by the creation of the Guidelines system,
successive attorneys general issued instructions that federal prosecutors should
generally prosecute the most serious readily provable offense.196 During the Bush
Administration, the political leadership at Main Justice welcomed legislation that
greatly restricted downward departures and imposed reporting requirements.197
Until the Supreme Court’s decision striking down key elements of the Sentencing
Reform Act, the U.S. Attorneys (and their AUSAs) were subject in every case to a
web of restrictions under the legislation, the Guidelines themselves, and the
Departmental regulations.198 Indeed, the Guidelines provided an extraordinary
new opportunity for greater central control of federal prosecution.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, also had a significant effect on
194
The evolution of the Department’s regulations on this issue, from Deputy Attorney General
Larry Thompson’s 2003 memo to the revision adopted by Deputy Attorney General Paul McNulty in
2006, is described in Daniel Richman, Decisions About Coercion: The Corporate Attorney-Client
Privilege Waiver Problem, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 295, 297–302 (2008). As Richman notes, the
McNulty memo distinguished between category I material, for which the approval of both the U.S.
Attorney and the head of the Criminal Division was required, and category II material, for which the
written permission of the Deputy Attorney General was required. Id. at 301. On August 28, 2008,
the Department announced the most recent version of its policy, USAM, supra note 26, §§ 9-28.000
to .1300, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcrm.htm.
See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Revises Charging Guidelines for Prosecuting
Corporate Fraud (Aug. 28, 2008), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/August/08-odag757.html (noting that “credit for cooperation will not depend on the corporation’s waiver of attorney
client-privilege,” that prosecutors are not permitted to request category II materials, and that they
may not consider whether the corporation has advanced attorneys fees to its officers and employees).
For a discussion of the controversy over the guidelines, and especially the issue of effectively
compelling a corporate defendant or suspect to waive its attorney client privilege, see Julie R.
O’Sullivan, The Last Straw: The Department of Justice’s Privilege Waiver Policy and the Death of
Adversarial Justice in Criminal Investigations of Corporations, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 329 (2008); see
also Richman, supra.
195
See generally Richman, supra note 61, at 1385–95; Kate Stith, The Arc of the Pendulum:
Judges, Prosecutors, and the Exercise of Discretion, 117 YALE L.J. 1420, 1440–43 (2008).
196
Compare Stith, supra note 195, at 1440–43, 1469–71 (describing memoranda from
Attorneys General Thornburg and Ashcroft), with Sara Sun Beale, The New Reno Bluesheet: A Little
More Candor Regarding Prosecutorial Discretion, in 6 FED. SENT’G REP. 310 (1994) (describing
memorandum from Attorney General Reno allowing some discretion in prosecuting most serious
readily provable offense).
197
See Richman, supra note 195, at 1388–90; Stith, supra note 195, at 1461–63, 1465–67.
198
See Stith, supra note 195, at 1468–71.

2009]

RETHINKING THE IDENTITY AND ROLE OF U.S. ATTORNEYS

405

the Department’s priorities and general approach. Terrorism became the top
departmental priority, and it had a strong centralizing effect, as Department
officials tried to “run the operation from the top.”199 The Attorney General
announced a new strategy of prevention (in contrast to the traditional focus on
prosecutions after criminal activity has occurred),200 and the Department took steps
“to maintain a coordinated and consistent national program while at the same time
empowering U.S. Attorneys’ Office across the country to pursue terrorism
investigations and prosecutions.”201 The Department mandated that each U.S.
Attorney create an Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council (ATAC) and appoint a senior
prosecutor as the ATAC coordinator to undertake a variety of responsibilities.202
In 2006, a National Security Division was established within Main Justice to
centralize management and coordinate operations and policy.203 The attorneys
from the new division have been actively involved in the decision of whether and
when to prosecute cases handled by the U.S. Attorney’s Offices.204
Although the Department has unquestionably expanded its authority and
correspondingly reduced that of the U.S. Attorneys, some factors have helped the
U.S. Attorneys retain a degree of their traditional independence and autonomy.
Although Congress promoted and even required central review of some
prosecutorial actions under the Guidelines, Daniel Richman has shown that over
the past several decades Congress has also acquiesced in, and even supported,
significant decentralization and independence in the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices.205 In
some cases, legislators have said so explicitly, and in other cases they have done so
199

Richman, supra note 195, at 1383–84.
See COUNTERTERRORISM SECTION, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, COUNTERTERRORISM WHITE PAPER 5
(June
22,
2006),
available
at
http://trac.syr.edu/tracreports/terrorism/169/include/terrorism.whitepaper.pdf (stating that September
11 “transformed the mission” of the Department and describing the “new strategy of prevention” as
the department’s “number one goal”).
201
Id. at 6.
202
Id. at 5–6.
203
For a description of the National Security Division’s origins and its first 18 months of
operation, see NATIONAL SECURITY DIV., U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, PROGRESS REPORT (April 2008),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/nsd/docs/2008/nsd-progress-rpt-2008.pdf.
204
NSD attorneys provide guidance on the important question of when to bring criminal
charges. The decision to prosecute a suspect exposes the Government’s interest in that
person and effectively terminates covert intelligence investigation. Such determinations
require the careful balancing of important competing interests: the immediate
incapacitation of a terrorist suspect and resultant disruption of terrorist activities through
prosecution, on the one hand, and the continuation of intelligence collection about the
subject’s plans, capabilities, and confederates on the other. The National Security
Division is well positioned to contribute to that decision-making process, by virtue of its
role in overseeing both the prosecution and intelligence components of the Justice
Department’s national security efforts.
Id. at 12.
205
Richman, supra note 190, at 805–10.
200
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implicitly by directing more resources and personnel to the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices
while limiting those given to Main Justice.206 These actions seem to reflect
Congress’s recognition of the value of the U.S. Attorneys as “a critical
counterweight to Washington politics.”207 For example, the independent role of
the U.S. Attorneys during the Watergate era compared favorably to Main Justice,
which succumbed to political pressures.208
Richman also notes that
decentralization serves another function, permitting Congress to distance itself,
when necessary, from enforcement decisions made in individual U.S. Attorneys’
Offices.209
Other changes have profoundly altered the national staffing patterns of U.S.
Attorneys’ Offices, promoting the independence and autonomy of those offices.
The growth in the federal caseload has required many more prosecutors, and the
U.S. Attorneys’ Offices have grown substantially. At the end of 2006, there were
approximately 8,000 lawyers working for the Department of Justice.210 Of those,
about two thirds were in U.S. Attorneys’ Offices rather than Main Justice.211
Although U.S. Attorneys’ Offices conduct civil as well as criminal litigation, they
allocate seventy-nine percent of their salaries to criminal litigation.212 The large
number of federal prosecutors and federal prosecutions by itself increases the
difficulty of central oversight. Equally important, the position of AUSA has been

206

Id. at 806–07.
Id. at 808.
208
Id.
209
Id. at 809.
210
The Department of Justice Budget and Performance Summary reports a total of 7,893
attorneys on board at the end of 2006, including 2,232 performing general legal activities, 345 in the
Antitrust Division (which is broken out because it is funded differently), and 5,316 in the U.S.
Attorneys’ Offices. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY2008 BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE SUMMARY 36 (2008)
DEP’T
OF
JUSTICE,
BUDGET
SUMMARY],
[hereinafter
U.S.
http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/2008summary/pdf/036_employment_categories.pdf.
The Department
estimated that it would have 8,662 attorneys in 2007. Id.
211
Id. The Statistical Report for the U.S. Attorneys reports a higher percentage of attorneys
are found in the Justice Department, but this seems to reflect the inclusion of lawyers whose duties do
not involve litigation. For fiscal year 2006, this report states that AUSAs constituted fifty-six percent
of all Department attorneys and seventy percent of the Department attorneys with prosecution or
litigation responsibilities. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR UNITED STATES
ATTORNEYS, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2006, at 3
(2006) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL REPORT], available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/reading_room/reports/asr2006/06statrpt.pdf.
212
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUDGET SUMMARY, supra note 210, at 82, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/jmd/2008summary/pdf/081_usa.pdf (estimating that 8,079 of personnel in U.S.
Attorneys’ Offices, or approximately seventy-nine percent, are involved in criminal litigation and
2,142 in civil litigation). Similarly, the Statistical Report for the U.S. Attorneys states that in fiscal
year 2006 about seventy-eight percent of attorney personnel were devoted to criminal prosecutions,
and ninety-five percent of all attorney work hours in the federal courts involved criminal rather than
civil cases. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 211, at 3.
207
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transformed from one of patronage to quasi-civil service.213 Only a few decades
ago, most AUSAs left their posts when the presidential administration changed.214
But civil service protection, including the right to appeal removal,215 and increased
salaries216 made the position more attractive and politically insulated. By 2006,
AUSAs nationwide had an average of eleven years of experience in the U.S.
Attorneys’ Office, as well as prior legal experience.217 As the number, tenure, and
experience level of AUSAs has grown, information networks have developed
among them.218 The emergence of a cadre of well-connected career AUSAs has
become a major factor promoting the autonomy of the U.S. Attorneys’ offices.219
In effect, more offices have reached the size and complexity of the exceptional
offices that had the greatest autonomy when Eisenstein conducted his study in the
early 1970s.
The Department itself has also taken at least one major organizational step to
return power to the U.S. Attorneys, merging the organized crime strike forces into
the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. The strike forces, which operated from 1966 to 1990,
used integrated teams of prosecutors and agents to bring down numerous members
and associates of Cosa Nostra, but they also provoked strenuous opposition from
the U.S. Attorneys.220 Attorney General Richard Thornburgh, who dissolved the
213

Eisenstein, U.S. Attorney Firings, supra note 66, at 235–39, n.44.
See Selection and Removal of U.S. Attorneys: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong.
(1978) (statement of Griffin Bell, Att’y Gen. of the United States) (discussing the high rate of
turnover of AUSAs in the late 1960s through the 1970s). See also EISENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 33
(noting that in many districts the appointment of AUSAs involved the U.S. Attorney in politics,
requiring a “complex process of negotiation, bargaining, and clearance of appointees with party
leaders”).
215
See Hamlett v. Dep’t of Justice, 90 M.S.P.R. 674 (2002) (holding that the removal power
specified by 28 U.S.C. § 542 does not bar an appeal under subch. II of ch. 75 of title 5), noted in
Eisenstein, U.S. Attorney Firings, supra note 66, at 237 n.44.
216
See Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial Agenda Setting in United States
Attorneys’ Offices: The Role of U.S. Attorneys and Their Assistants, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 271, 283 (2002)
(“General job satisfaction aside, two themes consistently were repeated in my interviews to explain
the growing length of tenure among assistants: first, the creation of a quasi-civil-service status for
assistants, and second, a significant increase in salary vis-à-vis the private sector, coupled with a
comparatively less demanding work environment.”).
217
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATISTICAL REPORT, supra note 211, at 3.
218
Eisenstein, U.S. Attorney Firings, supra note 66, at 239.
219
See id. at 239–40 (“The presence of career attorneys who take pride in their skills, regard
themselves as at least as knowledgeable and experienced as attorneys at Main Justice, and adhere to
their offices’ traditions of independence, all promote autonomy from DOJ control.”) Note, however,
that some experts contend that the increasing longevity and importance of AUSAs has negatively
impacted U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. See Lochner, supra note 216, at 284–87 (describing the problem
of “deadwood” AUSAs—careerists lacking motivation to take on complicated, time-intensive
matters—as making it more difficult for U.S. Attorneys to set prosecutorial agendas).
220
See Note, The Strike Force, supra note 160, at 519, tbl.II (strike force indictments and
convictions for about nineteen months, half of which involved members or associates of Cosa
214
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strike forces, had opposed the independence of strike force attorneys when he
served as the U.S. Attorney in Philadelphia.221 While the strike forces were still
operating, they had earned the ire of not only the local U.S. Attorneys, but also
local judges who preferred the practices of their local U.S. Attorneys. Indeed, the
Second Circuit once used its “supervisory power” to reverse a conviction because
the strike force attorney had deviated from the practice of the local U.S.
Attorney.222 The court justified its ruling as a “one-time sanction to encourage
uniformity of practice,” noting that it had surveyed the U.S. Attorneys in the circuit
and determined that all of them followed the same practice of giving grand jury
witnesses certain warnings.223 The case was remarkable both for its highly
questionable use of “supervisory power”224 and the court’s open hostility to the
division of authority between the strike forces and the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices.225
Finally, the growth in the federal caseload has effectively increased the
discretion of both U.S. Attorneys and their AUSAs. At each critical stage—
charging, plea negotiations, and sentencing—the sheer size of the federal caseload
Nostra). See also ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 176, at 8–9.
221
See James B. Jacobs & Elizabeth A. Mullin, Congress’ Role in the Defeat of Organized
Crime, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 269, 291 & n.140 (2003) (noting that critics charged Thornburg’s proposal
to eliminate the strike forces was motivated by turf concerns and citing Sen. Edward Kennedy’s
congressional testimony that as a former U.S. Attorney, Thornburg had “a longstanding record of
siding with the U.S. attorneys against strike forces in this turf battle”).
222
United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772 (2d Cir. 1976).
223
Id. at 773–74. The court stated:
Surprised, as we were, to find that what we had thought to be a common practice of
prosecutors in the circuit for more than twenty years was not followed, we canvassed
each of the United States Attorneys in the circuit for their practice in this regard. We
were informed that every United States Attorney, in practice, warns the potential
defendant that he is a target of the investigation. The appeal before us involved a
prosecution by the Strike Force in the Eastern District of New York as authorized by 28
U.S.C. § 515.
Id. at 774. The court then parsed the department’s regulations, concluding that the strike forces
should be subject to the direction of the U.S. Attorneys and also made clear its discomfort with the
strike force, stating that the court was “not committed by statute to allowing them to come into the
circuit and to evade the rules and supervision of the United States Attorneys.” Id. at 774.
224
The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ original decision in light of its holding
that target warnings were not required. Upon remand, the court of appeals made clear that its
decision rested on its supervisory power, and the Supreme Court then granted certiorari and twice
heard argument in the case before dismissing it as improvidently granted. See United States v.
Jacobs, 531 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1976), judgment vacated, 429 U.S. 909 (1976), on remand, 547 F.2d
772 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted, 431 U.S. 937 (1977), and cert. dismissed, 436 U.S. 31 (1978). For
a discussion of supervisory power including the Jacobs case, see Sara Sun Beale, Reconsidering
Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the Authority of the
Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1433 (1984).
225
The author of the opinion, Judge Murray Gurfein, had served briefly as an AUSA in the
Southern District of New York. See Federal Judicial Center, Judges of the United States Courts,
Gurfein, Murray Irwin, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/tGetInfo?jid=930. No other member of the panel
had experience as a federal prosecutor.
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makes centralized control very difficult. The difficulty of exercising supervision
from Main Justice is perhaps greatest in the case of the day to day decisions about
which cases to prosecute, since a case that is never filed is ordinarily invisible to
both members of the public and officials in Washington.
Thus, at the end of the day, U.S. Attorneys still wield substantial authority,
and that is especially true of the largest offices with the strongest traditions of
autonomy.
D. The Appointment and Removal of U.S. Attorneys
As noted above,226 the Judiciary Act of 1789 provided for the presidential
appointment of the federal attorneys and marshals in each district with the advice
and consent of the Senate. There appears to be general agreement that from the
outset the position of federal district attorney (later U.S. Attorney) was regarded as
a “‘political plum[]’” that went to party stalwarts,227 as well as agreement that
senators played an important role in the selection of candidates. Indeed, precisely
these features of the system have generated periodic calls for reform dating from at
least as early as the 1920s.228
Writing in 1937, former Attorney General Homer Cummings stated, “the rule
of senatorial courtesy gives individual Senators great powers in the selection of
district attorneys and marshals, an effective veto which imports local politics into
the administration of federal justice.”229 A few years earlier, the National
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement headed by former Attorney
General Wickersham made the same point, in greater detail, and argued that the
political character of the selection process was a serious problem:
At times, however, an obstacle to effective control and efficient
prosecution has been found in the power of the Senate with respect to
appointments. The claim of the Senate not merely to exercise a
226

See supra Part II.A.
HUSTON, supra note 130, at 64. These were, of course, members of the president’s party.
Eisenstein notes that “[i]n the overwhelming proportion of appointments, the department only
considers lawyers belonging to the president’s political party.” EISENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 35.
228
PREVENTING IMPROPER INFLUENCES, supra note 136, at 44 (describing proposals in 1924
following Teapot Dome scandal and in 1953 “after scandals in the Justice Department during the
Truman administration” to appoint U.S. Attorneys on the basis of merit, rather than politics, or to
place them under civil service and allow them to move freely from one district to another). Note that
in 1924 “[a] representative of the Attorney General’s office” recommended that both the U.S.
Attorneys and the Attorney General be appointed on the basis of merit rather than politics. Id.
229
CUMMINGS & MCFARLAND, supra note 131, at 499. Luther Huston agreed, commenting
that “no district attorney or marshal is likely to be appointed or removed without the approval of his
Senator or congressman.” James Eisenstein also recognized that senatorial courtesy gives senators a
“potent resource” that they can use “to exert significant influence on the final appointment,” but he
emphasized that several other factors affect the strategic environment for the appointments process.
EISENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 35.
227
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collective power of rejecting unfit nominations but to dictate
appointments as the patronage of the Senators of the State in which the
district lies has often had a bad effect upon the personnel and conduct of
the office. Also in States where the Senators are in opposition to the
administration it happens too often that local political organizations insist
on treating the office as political patronage . . . . The great powers of the
district attorney under the continual extensions of Federal jurisdiction in
the present century are giving increasing political importance to the
office. Hence this treatment of it as a reward for political activity is a
serious menace to enforcement of law.230
Another study of the Department of Justice concluded that the external
political constraints on the president’s appointment power were at their zenith in
the case of U.S. Attorneys, because “these are local offices aspired to by men
whose support is valued by Senators from their state and Congressmen from their
district,” and “often these aspirants are political leaders themselves in their
area.”231
The only area of disagreement seems to be over the precise balance of power
between the senators and the president and his attorney general. Some observers
of the Department concluded that the appointment process has been turned on its
head, with the senators effectively initiating nominations which are then submitted
to the President for approval. Daniel Meador and former Attorney General Griffin
Bell wrote:
The system has been and continues to be one in which the Senators, in
effect, often nominate individuals, the President consents, and then the
Senate confirms. If there are no Senators of the President’s party from
the state involved, then the state’s representatives of the President’s party
or other local party officials usually make the initial choice.232
James Eisenstein found that it was common for Senators to propose
candidates to the president, though in most cases they submitted a list containing
multiple names.233 He also emphasized that a number of factors influence the
appointments process. For example, when a new administration takes office, the
230
GEORGE W. WICKERSHAM, NATIONAL COMM’N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT,
REPORT ON PROSECUTION 9 (1931).
231
HUSTON, supra note 142, at 50. Huston states that it is sometimes more difficult to satisfy
local politicians regarding the appointment of U.S. Attorneys and marshals than the appointment of
Supreme Court justices). Id. Huston served as the Director of Public Information for the Department
of Justice under Attorney General Rogers from 1957–61. See Rolland L. Soule, Political Science
Book Reviews, 59 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 639 (1968).
232
Bell & Meador, supra note 124, at 249.
233
EISENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 43.
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president must satisfy numerous patronage commitments and political obligations
incurred in the process of the nomination and election, and the new
administration’s policy objectives will also play a role.234 Districts also varied a
great deal in their views of the U.S. Attorney’s role, with some districts having a
much greater expectation that the appointees will have significant legal stature and
experience, and others placing a much greater emphasis on the candidate’s political
qualifications.235 Senators also varied substantially in their interest in pushing
particular candidates.236
The active role taken by many senators and the ability of home state senators
to veto a nomination means that many U.S. Attorneys owe their appointments
primarily to persons other than the attorney general or the president. This may
lead to “a divided or ambiguous sense of allegiance” on the part of the U.S.
Attorneys.237 As noted in part I, for example, David Iglesias felt such a sense of
allegiance to Senator Domenici.238
In theory, the president’s power to remove U.S. Attorneys has always been
available “both as a stick used against disobedient U.S. Attorneys and a carrot to
others still in office.”239 But presidents have rarely used removal to restrict the
independence of U.S. Attorneys, at least in recent decades.240 Of fifty-four U.S.
Attorneys who did not serve a full term between 1981 and 2006, two were
removed by the president, three resigned after news reports indicated they had
engaged in questionable personal actions, and for another three, no information
was available.241 In 1974, former Attorney General Richard D. Kleindienst
testified to Congress that “[i]n 4 ½ years, I think there were only one or two
situations where a U.S. Attorney fell below the high standards that we felt should
be maintained and were asked to resign.”242 According to Kleindienst, these U.S.
Attorneys “resigned without any hesitation or question whatsoever.”243 In other
circumstances, a U.S. Attorney’s political support may actually prevent removal.244
234

Id. at 37.
Id. at 38–39.
236
Id. at 42.
237
Bell & Meador, supra note 124, at 248–49.
238
See text accompanying notes 33–34.
239
Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys Scandal” and the Allocation of
Prosecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 187, 206 (2008).
240
KEVIN M. SCOTT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. ATTORNEYS WHO HAVE SERVED LESS THAN
FULL FOUR-YEAR TERMS 1981–2006 (2007), discussed by Eisenstein, U.S. Attorney Firings, supra
note 66, at 233–34.
241
SCOTT, supra note 240, at 6–7. This number does not include U.S. Attorneys “whose
tenure was interrupted by a change in presidential administration.” Id. at Summary.
242
Removing Politics from the Administration of Justice: Hearing on S. 2803 and S. 2978
Before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong. 76
(1974) (statement of Richard G. Kleindienst) [hereinafter Hearing on Removing Politics].
243
Id.
235
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Still, removal has been identified as a controversial but potentially effective
mechanism of presidential control.245
E. Statutory Reforms Affecting the Department
The Watergate scandal provided the impetus for the enactment of legislation
that addressed concerns about the possible misuse of prosecutorial authority by
creating the offices of special prosecutor and inspector general. The enactment of
these reforms likely took some of the steam off other more radical proposals,
discussed in Part III,246 to restructure the Department.
The first innovation, the creation of an inspector general within the
Department of Justice, set the stage for the investigation and report described in
Part I. The legislation creating the post was not enacted until 1988,247 following a
decade of opposition from the Department.248 The Department argued that the
creation of an inspector general would interfere with the Attorney General’s law
enforcement responsibilities.249 Congress responded to these concerns by enacting
provisions specific to the inspector general of the Department of Justice.250 For
244
See EISENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 98 (describing the comments of a former attorney
general who fired some U.S. Attorneys but chose not to fire others to avoid conflict with interested
senators).
245
H.W. Perry, Jr., United States Attorneys—Whom Shall They Serve?, 61 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 129, 147 (1998) (“Firing a U.S. Attorney is a dramatic action that could have all sorts of
political ramifications. Nevertheless, Presidents could undoubtedly control U.S. Attorneys better if
they were willing to fire a few, particularly if done at the recommendation of the Attorney General.”).
246
See infra text accompanying notes 251 to 252.
247
Inspector General Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-504, § 102(c), 102 Stat.
2515, 2515 (1988).
248
See STAFF OF LEGISLATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMM. OF H. COMM. ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 100TH CONG., THE NEED FOR A STATUTORY INSPECTOR GENERAL IN THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 1 (Comm. Print 1988), for a description of struggles by the House of
Representatives to create an inspector general in the Department of Justice. According to that report,
“Justice was not included in the Inspector General Act of 1978 so that its need for a statutory IG
could be thoroughly reviewed.” Id. at 4. The House tried to create an inspector general at the
Department of Justice in each of the 96th through 99th Congresses, but the Senate killed the attempts.
Id. at 1. The department contended that it already had auditing mechanisms in place, id. at 1, and
raised “concern over the impact of an IG on departmental law enforcement operations and the ability
of the Attorney General to exercise broad-based discretion in directing Justice’s investigative,
prosecutorial, and litigation functions.” Id. at 4.
249
The Department opposed the legislation on the following grounds:
First, it would impose an Inspector General on the law enforcement authority of the
Attorney General; second, it would allow the Inspector General to interfere with or
jeopardize ongoing external investigations and prosecutions; and, third, it may require or
permit the Inspector General to disclose sensitive or confidential information.
Inspector General Act Amendments of 1987: Hearing on S. 908 Before the S. Comm. on Government
Affairs, 100th Cong. 29 (1987) (statement of Stephen J. Markman, Assistant Att’y Gen. of the United
States).
250
See VANESSA K. BURROWS & FREDERICK M. KAISER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., STATUTORY
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example, the Attorney General has greater power to end an investigation by the
inspector general than the heads of other departments,251 and the Office of
Professional Responsibility of the Department of Justice has greater authority over
the actions of attorneys in the department.252
A decade earlier, in a direct response to the Watergate scandal, Congress
created the office of special prosecutor (subsequently renamed independent
counsel) as part of the Ethics in Government Act.253 This innovative approach was
relatively short lived. The special prosecutor/independent counsel was to be
independent from the Department of Justice and Attorney General, so that it could
pursue investigations and prosecutions against senior officials within the
Department or other parts of the Administration free from political interference or
conflicts of interest. Although the Supreme Court upheld the legislation,254 it was
allowed to lapse in 1999.255 Subsequent “independent counsel” have been
appointed by the Attorney General pursuant to Departmental regulations, rather
than legislation.256
III. RETHINKING THE STATUS OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY
The preceding review of the problems experienced during the Bush
Administration and the historical evolution of the U.S. Attorneys’ position
spotlights several key issues. First, there is a danger that the U.S. Attorney’s
prosecutorial decision making can be improperly influenced by partisan politics.
Partisan influence or pressure can come from a wide range of sources, including
INSPECTORS GENERAL: LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS AND LEGAL ISSUES 2 n.3 (2007), for a list of
agencies in which the head has increased control over the inspector general.
251
5 U.S.C. § 8E(a)(1) (2006) (allowing the Attorney General to intervene in the inspector
general’s investigation if it involves certain areas of “sensitive information”).
252
See 5 U.S.C. § 8E(b)(3) (2006) (requiring the inspector general of the Department of
Justice to “refer to the Counsel, Office of Professional Responsibility of the Department of Justice,
allegations of misconduct involving Department attorneys, investigators, or law enforcement
personnel, where the allegations relate to the exercise of the authority of an attorney to investigate,
litigate, or provide legal advice, except that no such referral shall be made if the attorney is employed
in the Office of Professional Responsibility”).
253
The office of independent counsel was created by Independent Counsel Act, 28 U.S.C. § 40
(1978), and reauthorized for five years by the Independent Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1987,
Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§591–599). Although it
lapsed December 15, 1992, by failure of reauthorization, it was reinstituted by the Independent
Counsel Reauthorization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-270, 108 Stat. 732 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 591–599).
254
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
255
It expired at midnight on June 30, 1999. For a critique of the independent counsel statute
and an argument in favor of allowing it to expire, see Julie O’Sullivan, The Independent Counsel
Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 463 (1996).
256
See 28 C.F.R. § 600.1 (2009) (establishing grounds for appointment of an independent
counsel).
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members of Congress, home-state politicians and party activists, and the White
House itself. It may also arise from the U.S. Attorney’s own political ambitions.
But improper partisan efforts to manipulate prosecutorial charging decisions must
be distinguished from proper efforts to prosecute politically sensitive cases or to
compel adherence to the administration’s priorities257 and also from the exercise of
the president’s prerogative to appoint or remove individuals who have his full
confidence. Federal prosecutors must make choices about the allocation of
resources, selecting the kinds of cases and the individual defendants who will face
federal charges. Indeed, the need to prioritize has become even more critical
because of the explosive growth in the number and reach of federal criminal laws
and in the number of federal prosecutions. Federal criminal jurisdiction now
covers much of the same ground as state criminal law. Federal prosecutors can
reach a breathtakingly wide range of conduct, and they have enormous leverage in
a largely administrative system with extremely high sentences. The danger of
partisan manipulation has increased as well, because of the breadth and vagueness
of key federal corruption offenses. The growth of federal criminal law makes it
necessary to reassess the competing values of centralization to achieve uniformity
and best practices versus decentralization and flexibility to adapt to the enormous
variation in conditions from district to district. Those competing values are
reflected in the division of authority between the U.S. Attorneys and the senior
leadership in Main Justice.
In the aftermath of the Watergate crisis, there were serious proposals for a
radical redesign of the Department of Justice to lessen the president’s control and
make it operate more like an independent agency258 or to carve out the
prosecutorial function and place it in a separate nonpolitical agency.259 Whatever
257

As Bruce Green and Fred Zacharias have demonstrated, this is a very difficult line to draw.
See generally Green & Zacharias, supra note 9.
258
In 1974, the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary held hearings on several plans to reform the Department of Justice. Hearing on Removing
Politics, supra note 242. Senator Sam Ervin testified that he was “convinced of the utter necessity of
removing the Department, insofar as it is possible, from the play of partisan politics.” Id. at 3
(statement of Sen. Sam Ervin, Chairman, S. Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary). He proposed a bill removing the Department of Justice from the executive branch.
This bill would ensure the separation of constitutional powers by establishing the Department of
Justice as an independent establishment of the United States. Id. Under his proposal, the Department
of Justice would resemble an independent regulatory commission, with the Attorney General
appointed by the President to a six year term. Id. The bill granted the Attorney General power to
appoint and remove U.S. Attorneys.
259
Whitney North Seymour, Jr., former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York,
proposed dividing the Department of Justice by function. See Hearing on Removing, supra note 242,
at 215–16 (statement of Whitney North Seymour, Jr.). According to Seymour, the Department was
flawed because the Attorney General was expected “to serve two masters at the same time”—the
president and the law. Id. at 216. As a remedy, Seymour proposed creating the Office of Chief
Prosecutor (including the U.S. Attorneys), which would direct “all of the existing civil and criminal
litigation and law enforcement functions in the Department of Justice.” Id. at 217–18. Interestingly,
though, the appointment power would remain with the president, in order to give U.S. Attorneys “a

2009]

RETHINKING THE IDENTITY AND ROLE OF U.S. ATTORNEYS

415

the merits of such proposals, there is no substantial support at the present time for a
total redesign of the Department of Justice, particularly one that raises serious
constitutional issues by seeking to reduce the president’s control over a central
executive function.260 Accordingly, I take as a starting point the current structure
of the Department: it is an agency of the executive branch headed by the attorney
general and other senior officials who are appointed by the president with the
advice and consent of the Senate and who serve at the president’s pleasure.
Given the Department’s character as an executive branch agency, the question
is whether to maintain the unique two-tier structure that now divides authority over
criminal prosecutions between the presidential appointees serving in Main Justice
and the 93 presidential appointees serving as the U.S. Attorneys in each federal
judicial district. As noted in the preceding section, for more than a century power
has been shifting, albeit in a halting and uneven fashion, from the U.S. Attorneys
to the Department. Should the process of centralization under the attorney general
and the political leadership in Main Justice be completed? Perhaps it is time to
treat the historical status of the U.S. Attorneys as a vestige of the past and to
convert the position of U.S. Attorney to a career civil service status.261 This would
bring the department’s structure in line with those of other executive branch
agencies and reduce the bottleneck in the appointments process that occurs at the
beginning of each new administration.
I conclude that the present two-tier structure of the Justice Department should
be maintained. Converting the U.S. Attorneys to nonpolitical career employees
might reduce, but cannot eliminate, the possibility that partisan concerns will
improperly influence decisions. The benefits of that reduction in political
influence must be balanced against the other values served by the present system,
which provides an important check or counterweight on the authorities in Main
Justice. The political character of the current appointment cuts both ways. It may
stature in keeping with the importance of the office.” Id. Seymour was particularly concerned with
Senate confirmation, which he saw as the principal source of partisanship among U.S. Attorneys. Id.
He, therefore, suggested organizing Circuit Nominating Commissions by federal judicial district. Id.
The president would nominate U.S. Attorneys from lists drafted by these commissions, and only then
would the Senate have its say in the traditional confirmation role. Id.
260
For a discussion of some of the constitutional issues, see ROBERT L. TIENKEN, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES RAISED BY S. 2803, 93D CONGRESS—TO ESTABLISH AN
INDEPENDENT DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1974), and David C. Weiss, Note, Nothing Improper?
Examining Constitutional Limits, Congressional Action, Partisan Motivation, and Pretextual
Justifications in the U.S. Attorney Removals, 107 MICH. L. REV. 317, 353–54 (2008).
261
Similar—and perhaps even stronger—arguments could be made regarding the traditional
presidential appointment of the U.S. marshal in each district. One federal judge has called publicly
on Congress to professionalize the Marshals Service by eliminating patronage appointments. Sean P.
Murphy, Judge Hits Politics in Choice of Marshals, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 1, 2007, at B1 (describing
critical comments of Judge William Young and dismissal of prior marshal in the District of
Massachusetts after press disclosures of his “lax work habits and use of his government-owned
vehicle for personal errands”). Senator Edward Kennedy has supported professionalization of the
marshals, and he was responsible for adding a provision to the Patriot Act establishing criteria for
marshals, including four years of command-level law enforcement experience. Id.
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be a source of improper pressure on U.S. Attorneys, but as a counterweight it may,
upon occasion, actually prevent the misuse of prosecutorial authority for partisan
purposes.
Moreover, to serve as that counterweight, maintaining Senate
confirmation is highly desirable. Equally important, by placing greater authority in
the hands of each U.S. Attorney the current system localizes the administration of
federal criminal law, reinforcing federalism and allowing districts some leeway to
adapt federal law to local law enforcement conditions and local practices and
norms. It provides a useful structure for a continuing dialogue on what should be
uniform and what should be tailored to local conditions. The current system,
including both presidential nomination and Senate confirmation, also enhances the
prestige of the U.S. Attorney, attracting candidates and providing them with the
clout to serve effectively as the chief federal law enforcement officer. It also
enhances critical relationships with state and local officials and with federal
investigative agencies. The link between the U.S. Attorney and the president who
appointed her can be a mechanism for enforcing each administration’s policies and
priorities, and the political skills and contacts of U.S. Attorneys are valuable. The
current system also provides a mechanism for political accountability.
Thus the present system is susceptible to political manipulation, but it would
be short sighted to dismiss it as a mere historical vestige. Delegating some degree
of political authority to the U.S. Attorney in each federal judicial district serves
many valuable functions. What is needed, then, are other mechanisms that reduce
the danger of improper political manipulation. In the last section of this article, I
sketch out briefly three approaches that are consistent with the system of
presidential appointments: screening or nominations panels, restrictions on contact
between U.S. Attorneys and political officials, and clarifying and perhaps
restricting the scope of the offenses used to prosecute state and local corruption.
A. Politics and Prosecutions
At first blush the conversion of the position of U.S. Attorney seems desirable
as a way to take the politics out of federal prosecutions, removing a perennial
source of concern that became especially pronounced during the Bush
Administration.
Because political affiliation and activities are important criteria in the current
system, U.S. Attorneys often have their own political aspirations and strong
ideological commitments.262 The risk that politics may improperly influence
prosecutorial discretion seems to be heightened in a system in which U.S.
Attorneys are both politically ambitious and ideological. As H.W. Perry
explained:
A person who is seeking high profile cases and is particularly ideological
262

See Perry, supra note 245, at 143 (creating four-quadrant matrix employing two axes, from
high to low political aspirations and from highly ideological to non-ideological, which creates four
types of U.S. Attorneys).
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might be more tempted to use the power of the office for partisan
reasons. High profile cases do not necessarily equal partisan cases, but
where the U.S. Attorney has high political aspirations and is particularly
ideological, there seems to be a greater chance for more partisan
justice.263
As one member of the House Judiciary Committee explained, the present
selection process produces U.S. Attorneys who “want to be Federal judges,
Governors, or Congressmen” and “are going to do that which is politically
expedient for them.”264 Ambitious and ideologically committed U.S. Attorneys
may want to exercise their authority in a manner that curries favor with the
president and his political advisers. And, as noted in Parts I and II, the Senate
confirmation process gives the home state senators enormous influence at the time
of the U.S. Attorney’s appointment, which may pave the way for later efforts to
influence the U.S. Attorney’s prosecutorial decisions. Any or all of these
influences might lead the U.S. Attorney to exercise prosecutorial discretion for
improper partisan reasons, such as accelerating or delaying charges in order to
influence an election,265 or bringing charges against political opponents based on
overly broad interpretations of vague statutes such as honest services mail fraud
and federal program bribery.266 Similar influences may lead the U.S. Attorney to
ignore corruption, especially if the same party controls the White House and the
local political machine.267
In contrast, redefining the U.S. Attorney as a senior nonpartisan position and
using a civil service merit selection process would generally result in the selection
of non-ideological U.S. Attorneys with low political aspirations. This should
greatly reduce the danger that U.S. Attorneys will act for political reasons.
Moreover, the U.S. Attorneys would not in any sense be beholden to either the
president or their home state senators, and hence not subject to pressure from them.
263

Id. at 144.
Selection and Removal of U.S. Attorneys: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 79 (1978)
(statement of Rep. Robert F. Drinan, Member, Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the
Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary). See also Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron
Relevant to Federal Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469, 486 (1996) (commenting that because
U.S. Attorneys are “extraordinarily ambitious and frequently enter electoral politics after leaving
office . . . they have strong incentives to use their power while in office to cater to—or to
circumvent—local political establishments”).
265
See supra text accompanying notes 16–24 (describing pressure felt by U.S. Attorney
Iglesias to bring voter fraud indictments before election).
266
See supra text accompanying notes 104–05, 106–13 (describing extremely broad
interpretations of honest services mail fraud federal program bribery in the prosecutions of Georgia
Thompson and former governor Don Seigelman). Dan Kahan argues that U.S. Attorneys have an
incentive to internalize the political benefits and externalize the practical and human costs of
overbroad interpretations of federal criminal statutes. Kahan, supra note 264, at 487–88.
267
I thank Al Alschuler for drawing this point to my attention.
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For example, if New Mexico U.S. Attorney David Iglesias had been a career civil
service employee, he would not have felt that he owed his job to Senator Domenici
or President Bush. Redefining the U.S. Attorneys as nonpartisan civil service
employees would also clarify their place within the hierarchy of the Department:
they would have no claim to independence and would be subject to the supervision
and control of the political leadership within the Department. The number of
nominations from the Justice Department would fall into line with those from other
departments, reducing the strain on the resources of the Judiciary Committee.
Redefining the character of the U.S. Attorneys might also increase their quality. A
merit selection process should also ensure that every U.S. Attorney would have
had substantial litigation experience, which is not always the case under the current
system,268 and it might also produce better management of the U.S. Attorneys’
Offices.269
This thumbnail sketch of nonpartisan U.S. Attorneys has undoubted appeal,
but recall that our starting point is the assumption that the Department will be
headed by political appointees, including the Attorney General. Precisely because
the Constitution does not permit the prosecutorial function to be divorced entirely
from politics in its broadest sense, the question is whether—on balance—it is
helpful to have actors with independent political status and responsibility within
each judicial district as well as in Washington. There have been occasional
suggestions that political interference is more likely or more dangerous at the
district level,270 but that does not entirely square with the picture that emerges from
parts I and II of this article. Indeed, in most of the cases where there have been
accusations of improper political meddling during the Bush administration,
officials in the White House were implicated.271 Similarly, during the Nixon
268

For example, J. Strom Thurmond, Jr., the son of Senator J. Strom Thurmond, was twentynine years old when he was nominated to be U.S. Attorney for South Carolina; he had been a lawyer
for about three years and had tried seven state cases. See Clif LeBlanc, 2 Emerge in S.C. Search for
New U.S. Attorney, THE STATE, Dec. 10, 2004, at B1. Margaret Currin had been out of law school for
approximately nine years when she was appointed to succeed her husband, Sam Currin, as U.S.
Attorney for the Eastern District of North Carolina, but she had little or no trial experience, having
served first as legislative director and counsel to Senator John Tower, and then as assistant dean and
associate professor at Campbell University School of Law. See AMERICAN ASSOC. OF LAW SCHOOLS,
THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 413 (2007–2008) (biographical entry for Margaret Person
Currin).
269
H.W. Perry suggests that U.S. Attorneys who fit this profile (Type IV in his scheme)
“would run an office that would reward high efficiency” and “would gain satisfaction from
processing workloads and would seek to maximize winning all types of cases.” Perry, supra note
245, at 144.
270
Former Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach said that “political influence in the
administration of justice is more likely to start at the bottom, locally, personally, than at the top.”
Hearing on Removing Politics, supra note 258, at 155 (statement of Nicholas Katzenbach).
271
See supra text accompanying notes 18–24, 91–96, 114–17 (describing allegations
concerning involvement of presidential counselor Karl Rove in Thompson and Siegelman
prosecutions as well as allegations that Senator Domenici and others contacted the White House
seeking the ouster of U.S. Attorney Iglesias when he refused to prosecute Democrats for election
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administration, the Attorney General and one Assistant Attorney General were
convicted of criminal conduct,272 and the Nixon administration has also been
accused of bringing a politically motivated prosecution against one high profile
political enemy, former Illinois governor Otto Kerner.273 In contrast, some
commentators have concluded that the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices should be given
high marks for their independent and professional performance during the Nixon
administration.274 Because their constituencies and political loyalties are primarily
within their own state and judicial district, U.S. Attorneys can function to some
degree as a check on, or a counterweight against, the political appointees in the
Department and in the White House.
Making U.S. Attorneys career appointees or eliminating the requirement of
Senate confirmation would insulate them from partisan pressures from Congress
(especially their home-state senators), but it would also affect their ability to
withstand partisan political pressures from officials in the White House or Main
Justice. For example, what if a White House political strategist (who might be in
league with local officials of their party) wished to use criminal charges to
neutralize a popular Democratic politician or to create an issue in an upcoming
election? A career U.S. Attorney would not share this political goal, but would she
be in a position to withstand pressure to, for example, continue or expand an
investigation that does not seem to be leading anywhere? A career appointee (or a
political appointee not subject to Senate confirmation) will lack certain advantages
that flow from the current selection process. Because the appointment is regarded
as a political plum, it is ordinarily reserved for a local attorney who knows and is

fraud).
272

See United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 51–52 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (upholding conviction
of Attorney General John Mitchell). For a list of those who were indicted by the Watergate grand
jury, see John W. Dean, III, Watergate: What Was It?, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 609, 611 n.6 (2000). See
also id. at 612 (noting others, including former Attorney General Kleindienst, who pled guilty).
273
One prominent example is the conviction of Otto Kerner (who served as governor of
Illinois and as a judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit) for depriving his
constituents of his “honest services” and hence violating the mail fraud statute. See United States v.
Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 417 U.S. 976 (1974) (upholding Kerner’s conviction).
One commentator charged that Kerner was prosecuted because he had earned the ire of Richard
Nixon for his role in helping to deliver Illinois’s electoral votes to John Kennedy, and that he was the
“innocent victim of a vindictive president.” HANK MESSICK, THE POLITICS OF PROSECUTION: JIM
THOMPSON, MARJE EVERETT, RICHARD NIXON, AND THE TRIAL OF OTTO KERNER 220 (1978). See also
Williams, supra note 179, at 148 (noting that Kerner was prosecuted during the Nixon administration,
which brought no charges against thirteen key legislators who were known to have been involved in
the conduct that gave rise to Kerner’s prosecution).
274
See, e.g., O’Sullivan, supra note 255, at 476 nn.55 & 57 (noting that the U.S. Attorney’s
Office had already developed main outlines of Watergate charges when the Independent Counsel was
appointed, and also noting the success of U.S. Attorneys in bringing nonpolitical prosecutions of
other major figures, including Vice President Spiro Agnew); Herbert J. Miller, Jr. & John P. Elwood,
The Independent Counsel Statute: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, 62 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
111, 115 (1999) (same).
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known by her district.275 Many such appointees have already served in elective
office and have their own political base.276 The confirmation process ensures that
they have either the active sponsorship or at least the acquiescence of their homestate senators and other key local political leaders, as well as the local district
judges. These local constituencies have historically backed up the U.S. Attorney
in disputes with the Department.277 A career U.S. Attorney would ordinarily not
have developed an independent political base, and may indeed have been brought
in from outside the district. Indeed, determined political leadership can
marginalize and even drive out career attorneys who are not seen as compliant or
committed to the administration’s policies. It is instructive to compare the
situation of the U.S. Attorneys, whose noisy removal generated widespread
criticism in the press, Congressional hearings, and a massive report by the IG, with
the situation of a number of career supervisory attorneys in the Civil Rights
Division, whose advice was ignored or overruled by political appointees, and who
were demoted and reassigned to work on unrelated cases during the Bush
administration.278
275

See supra text accompanying notes 221–25.
See generally EISENSTEIN, supra note 133, at 80–81.
277
See Eisenstein, supra note 133, at 81 (district judge orders lawyers from Main Justice out of
the courtroom), id. at 82 (U.S. Attorney refuses to follow instructions from Main Justice and invites
them to call chief judge of the district knowing that judge would back him up), id. at 115–16 (assaults
on autonomy of U.S. Attorney would be resisted by alumni of office, including district judges, and
district court judges would “cut [the] balls off” of a strike force attorney who was not vouched for by
the local U.S. Attorney).
278
Some of the issues were aired at a Senate Committee hearing in 2006. See Oversight of the
Civil Rights Division: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006), 2006 WL
3324886 (statement of Joseph Rich, Lawyer’s Committee for Civil Rights Under Law) (describing
how longtime career supervisors in the Civil Rights Division who were considered to have views that
differed from those of the political appointees in the Bush administration were reassigned or stripped
of major responsibilities, resulting in loss of morale and a large number attorney resignations),
available
at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?renderforprint=1&id=2434&wit_id=5849;
Id.
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary). See also Dan
Eggen, Justice Staff Saw Texas Districting as Illegal, WASH. POST, Dec. 2, 2005, at A1, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/01/AR2005120101927_pf.html
(describing conflict between career and political staff in Civil Rights Division in voting rights case).
The IG’s report sharply criticizes Bradley Schlozman, who served in various senior positions,
including Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Division, for improperly considering political or
ideological affiliations in hiring career attorneys, assigning individual cases, and forcing the transfer
of three appellate attorneys, but it does not focus generally on the broader complaint that career
supervisors were either demoted or otherwise removed from the decisionmaking process. See OFFICE
OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. & OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN
INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS OF POLITICIZED HIRING AND OTHER IMPROPER PERSONNEL ACTIONS
IN
THE
CIVIL
RIGHTS
DIVISION
33–35,
42–43,
45
(2008),
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/s0901/final.pdf. The report concluded with a criminal referral to
determine whether criminal charges would be warranted in light of Mr. Schlozman’s statements to
Congress. Id. at 63.
276
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Finally, it is important to recognize that there may be far less difference than I
have assumed in the ambitions of presidential appointees and career nonpartisan
U.S. Attorneys.279 A U.S. Attorney, however appointed, has the opportunity to be
involved in high profile cases and to develop the kinds of contacts and name
recognition that could pave the way to elective office or a judicial appointment.
Accordingly, a politically ambitious young lawyer might seek a “career”
appointment as an AUSA and then U.S. Attorney in the hopes that it would
provide a platform for a later elective office or judicial appointment. And an
attorney who had no political ambitions when he or she joined the U.S. Attorney’s
Office and was promoted to U.S. Attorney might develop such aspirations after
serving for some time as U.S. Attorney. The possibility that some “career” U.S.
Attorneys would have or develop such ambitions further weakens the case for
restructuring the selection process as a means of eliminating partisan politics from
prosecutorial decisionmaking.
B. The Value of Localizing Federal Prosecution
The issue of presidential appointment is inevitably bound up with the question
whether to further unify and centralize federal prosecution. Since its inception,
one of the hallmarks of the federal criminal justice system has been that it is
administered at the district level by prosecutors and judges drawn from that
district.280 This system is consistent with the design of the U.S. Constitution and
with the norms that govern the administration of criminal law in the United States.
Federal criminal law is the exception, rather than the rule. It is the states, rather
than the federal government, that have general police powers. Moreover states
have deliberately dispersed and fragmented the power to investigate and prosecute
crime so that this authority is administered at the local level. For example, there
are presently more than 2,300 prosecutors’ offices in the United States, and most
of those prosecutors are elected.281 The tradition of popular local control of the
administration of criminal justice has deep historical roots.282 This tradition
reflects a recognition of the significant differences between individual
communities and the belief that local control serves as a safeguard against
administrative misuse of authority.283

279

Both Rachel and Tony Barkow drew this important point to my attention.
See generally supra notes 221–31 and accompanying text.
281
STEVEN W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL SURVEY OF PROSECUTORS:
PROSECUTORS
IN
STATE
COURTS,
2005
1,
2
(2006),
available
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/psc05.pdf (reporting there were 2,344 prosecutors’ offices and
these offices were headed by elected chief prosecutors in all states except Alaska, Connecticut, the
District of Columbia, and New Jersey).
282
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.4(b) (3d ed. 2007).
283
Id.
280
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The structure of the federal criminal justice system has respected the states
and the local communities within the states, allowing federal criminal laws to be
administered in a fashion that is tailored to those local communities and their
needs. Like the states, the federal system has fragmented and dispersed the
authority to prosecute crimes. Since the Judiciary Act of 1789, federal criminal
law has been administered at the district level, and federal judicial districts have
been comprised of individual states or, when the population is sufficient, portions
of a single state.284 Like federal district judges, the U.S. Attorneys are nearly
always drawn from within the judicial district,285 and the political character of their
appointment serves, to some degree, as a proxy for their connection to the values
and priorities of that district. Indeed, what appears to be an anomaly viewed from
the perspective of the federal bureaucracy mimics the local political control of
elected prosecutors at the state and local level.286 Moreover, the U.S. Attorneys
practice within that district, in front of the local district judges and local juries,
where they are generally opposed by the local defense bar as well as the federal
public defender for the district. The system of regulating legal practice at the state
level287 reinforces this local orientation. Indeed, the local rules in many districts
require membership in that state’s bar as a prerequisite for membership in the bar
of the district court, though they may exempt some or all attorneys representing the
United States.288 These structural features have persisted, despite the centralization
284

See generally supra text accompanying notes 123–25.
See supra text accompanying note 275. There are occasional exceptions, most recently the
high profile appointment of Patrick Fitzgerald as U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of Illinois.
Fitzgerald’s appointment was sponsored by his home-state senator, who favored experienced
prosecutors from other federal districts for all three U.S. Attorney’s positions in Illinois. See
Fitzgerald’s Finest Achievement, CHI. TRIB., July 14, 2002, at 8 (praising Sen. Peter Fitzgerald for
sponsoring Patrick Fitzgerald and two other nominees who had “no ties to the state's giant law firms
or political power structure to serve as U.S. attorney, the most important corruption-fighting position
in government”).
286
I thank Dan Richman for bringing this point to my attention.
287
See generally GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING §
1.17 (3d ed. Supp. 2007).
288
For examples of local rules that limit membership in the bar of the district court to
attorneys admitted to practice in that state but allowing government attorneys to practice before the
court without meeting this requirement, see, e.g., M.D. ALA. LOC. R. 83.1(a)(1) & (c); N.D. ALA.
LOC. R. 83.1(a); W.D. N.C. LOC. R. 83.1(C); W.D. VA. LOC. R. III, Att’y Admiss. (1) & (6).
There is considerable variation in the local rules. The rules of some districts seem to place the
local U.S. Attorney’s Office in the role of gatekeeper in determining whether other attorneys for the
government should be permitted to appear in the district court without meeting all of the standard
rules for an appearance pro hac vice. See, e.g., D. MISS. LOC. R. 83.1(A)(3) (allowing attorneys
representing the United States, its agencies, or employees to appear in the district court without being
admitted “upon proper introduction to the court by the United States Attorney for this district or one
of the United States Attorney’s assistants”); E.D. VA. LOC. R. 83.1(A) & (D) (providing that
members of the Virginia state bar are eligible to practice in the district, allowing “foreign attorneys”
to appear pro hac vice when accompanied by a member of the bar of the district court, but exempting
from this requirement “[f]ederal government attorneys appearing pursuant to the authority of the
United States Attorney’s Office,” and noting specifically that other attorneys for the Department of
285
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of authority described in Part II. Indeed, the need to rely on and partner with state
and local investigators to develop many kinds of federal cases cuts strongly against
central control.289 In particular, federal prosecutors are heavily dependent upon
state and local investigators for many of the gun and drug prosecutions that now
make up such a large part of the federal caseload.290 In effect, the U.S. Attorneys
are embedded in the “local legal-political economy,”291 and their dependence on
local information networks promotes decentralization.
The present federal system is a hybrid. The substantive laws, the rules of
criminal procedure,292 and the sentencing guidelines293 are national, but they are
applied by U.S. Attorneys (as well as district judges and defense lawyers) who are
drawn from a single state or a subdivision within a state. The structure of the
system provides a mechanism for some adaptation or amelioration of federal laws
that may be ill-suited to the conditions—or the norms—of particular districts. But
there are also mechanisms within the Department of Justice and within the judicial
system for harmonization, and, when necessary, for the enforcement of uniform
standards and procedures. Indeed, the present system allows a healthy dialogue on
the question when uniformity is necessary and when variation should be
permitted.294 Since 9/11 uniformity and centralized control have been favored for
Justice must secure local counsel).
Other district court rules eschew the local orientation, allowing an attorney admitted to practice
in any state or in any federal district to be admitted to practice in that district. See, e.g., S.D. ILL.
LOC. R. 83.1(a) (admitted in any state); W.D. N.Y. LOC. R. 83.1(f) (admitted in any United States
District Court and the state bar in which that district is located).
There is some doubt about the validity of local rules that would restrict the attorneys who may
represent the United States in the district courts. The Department of Justice has taken the position
that such provisions are inconsistent with 28 U.S.C. § 515(a) (2007). Telephone Interview with Colm
Connolly, U.S. Att’y for the Dist. of Del. (Jan. 8, 2009).
289
Richman, supra note 61, at 1396.
290
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, CHANGING FACE OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL SENTENCING 1, 9 tbl.4
(2008) (noting increase in drug trafficking, immigration, fraud, and firearms cases accounted for
91.8% of the increase in the caseload from 1991 to 2007), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/general/20081230_Changing_Face_Fed_Sent.pdf.
291
Richman, supra note 61, at 1405.
292
The Sumners Courts Act, 76 Pub. L. No. 675, ch. 445, 54 Stat. 688 (1940), authorized the
development and promulgation of national rules of procedure for criminal cases, and the first Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure were subsequently adopted by order of the Supreme Court on December
26, 1944, and took effect on March 21, 1946. See generally George H. Dession, The New Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure: I, 55 YALE L.J. 694, 694–96 (1946).
293
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, tit. II, ch. 2, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.), created the United States Sentencing
Commission and authorized it to promulgate national sentencing guidelines. For a general discussion
of the origins of the Commission and the guidelines, see Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361
(1989) (holding that the guidelines the Commission promulgated did not violate principle of
separation of powers).
294
For an excellent discussion of the related question of the level at which discretion should be
exercised in individual cases, see Green & Zacharias, supra note 239.
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terrorism related prosecutions, and that is not likely to change.295 But other issues
are open to debate. For example, some U.S. Attorneys have opposed the
centralization of the death penalty approval process, which now permits the
Department of Justice to override the U.S. Attorney’s recommendation not to seek
death.296 It seems likely that subsequent administrations will revisit this issue.
Indeed, sentencing in non-capital cases provides an excellent example of the
degree to which local federal districts have retained a distinct character. Although
the Sentencing Reform Act297 was adopted twenty-five years ago to eliminate
unwarranted sentencing disparity, there are still wide variations from district to
district on such measures as the percentage of defendants sentenced within the
Guideline range and the percentage who receive sentences below the range over
the opposition of the government support.298 These figures reflect more than just
variations in the practices or attitudes of the district judges (or the courts of
appeal).299 There are also equally wide variations in government practices and the
sentencing factors controlled by the government.300 This is particularly apparent in
the statistics concerning sentencing reductions under U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1, which may
be awarded only upon the government’s motion to defendants who have provided
“substantial assistance” in the prosecution of others.301 There are districts that
295

Daniel C. Richman, Political Control of Federal Prosecutors—Looking Back and Looking
L.J.
(forthcoming
May
2009),
available
at
Forward,
58
DUKE
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1289434.
296
Glaberson, supra note 189, at A1.
297
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 and 28 U.S.C.).
298
In 2007, for example, nationwide 60.8% of defendants were sentenced within the
applicable Guidelines range. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE,
DISTRICT & CIRCUIT, OCTOBER 1, 2006, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2007, tbl. 9 (2007), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/JUDPACK/JP2007.htm. But many districts varied substantially from that
average. Fewer than fifty percent of the defendants were sentenced within range in thirteen districts,
and more than eighty percent of defendants were sentenced within range in ten other districts. Id.
299
The departure rates among the courts of appeals vary widely. See NORMAN ABRAMS &
SARA SUN BEALE, 2008 SUPPLEMENT TO FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 239–44
(comparing departure rates in selected circuits before and after Supreme Court’s 2007 decisions in
Rita, Gall, and Kimbrough); Paul J. Hofer et al., Departure Rates and Reasons after Koon v. U.S., 9
FED. SENT’G. REP. 284, 286 (1997) (noting that circuits developed different sentencing personas and
considering how different circuits responded to Supreme Court’s decision in Koon). The Circuits that
Hofer et al. found to have the highest departure rates in 1997, the Ninth and the Second, see id. at
286–87, continued to have high rates in 2007. See U.S. SENT’G. COMM’N, PRELIMINARY POSTKIMBROUGH/GALL
DATA
REPORT,
tbls.
1-DC,
1-9
(2008),
available
at
http://www.ussc.gov/USSC_Kimbrough_Gall_Report_September_08_Final.pdf.
300
U.S. SENT’G. COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS BY STATE, DISTRICT & CIRCUIT,
OCTOBER 1, 2006, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2007, tbl. 9 (2007), available at
http://www.ussc.gov/JUDPACK/JP2007.htm.
301
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2008) provides:
§5K1.1. Substantial Assistance to Authorities (Policy Statement)
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed
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typically have very low rates of substantial assistance departures and other districts
where more than a third of all defendants receive such government sponsored
downward departures.302 As these statistics indicate, each district has its own
character, which reflects not only the law enforcement situation in the district, but
also the attitudes and practices of both the district judges and the U.S. Attorneys
Office. A 1998 study by the staff of the Sentencing Commission confirmed this
point, finding wide variations among U.S. Attorneys Offices regarding their
practices concerning substantial assistance departures.303 Similar differences in
from district to district exist on many other prosecutorial practices that have a
significant bearing on sentences.304

an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.
(a)
The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons stated that
may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the following:
(1)
the court’s evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the
defendant’s assistance, taking into consideration the government’s
evaluation of the assistance rendered;
(2)
the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or
testimony provided by the defendant;
(3)
the nature and extent of the defendant’s assistance;
(4)
any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or
his family resulting from his assistance;
(5)
the timeliness of the defendant’s assistance.
302
There were downward departures in 35.7% of the cases in the Southern District of Ohio,
and 3.3% in the District of New Mexico. U.S. SENT’G. COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
BY STATE, DISTRICT & CIRCUIT, OCTOBER 1, 2006, THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 2007, tbl. 9 (2007),
available at http://www.ussc.gov/JUDPACK/JP2007.htm. In comparison, the national average was
14.4%. Id. In the six districts in which prosecutors were the most generous with substantial
assistance motions, more than one third of defendants received downward departures for their
cooperation. Id. (D. D.C., E.D. Pa., M.D. Pa., E.D. Ky., S.D. Ohio, and M.D. Ala.). In twenty-four
other districts fewer than ten percent of defendants received such departures. Id. (D. P.R., D. R.I.,
E.D. Va., W.D. Va., N.D. W. Va., S.D. W. Va., E.D. La., S.D. Miss., S.D. Tex., W.D. Tex., S.D. Ill.,
W.D. Wis., D. Neb., D. S.D., D. Alaska, D. Ariz., S.D. Cal., E.D. Wash., D. N.M., W.D. Okla., D.
Utah, D. Wyo., S.D. Ga., D. Del.).
303
LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD & JOHN H. KRAMER, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SUBSTANTIAL
ASSISTANCE: AN EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK GAUGING EQUITY IN CURRENT FEDERAL POLICY AND
PRACTICE 8–9, 10 (1998), available at http://www.ussc.gov/publicat/5kreport.pdf (finding
disagreement among districts regarding appropriateness availability of substantial assistance
departure when a defendant provides information concerning his or her own behavior and a lack of
uniformly applied criteria for determining when assistance was substantial). For an argument that the
Department of Justice’s failure to manage the unilateral authority to move for substantial assistance
created a judicial backlash, see Frank O. Bowman, III, Departing is Such Sweet Sorrow: A Year of
Judicial Revolt on “Substantial Assistance” Departures Follows a Decade of Prosecutorial
Indiscipline, 29 STETSON L. REV. 7 (1999).
304
See, e.g., Statement of District Judge Robert L. Hinkle Before the U.S. Sentencing
Comm’n,
Atlanta,
Ga.
2–3,
6
(Feb.
11,
2009)
http://www.ussc.gov/agendas/20090210/Hinkle_statement.pdf (noting variation from district to
district in whether prosecutors apply relevant conduct broadly or narrowly and whether they always
file notice of a defendant’s prior conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 851).
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The existence of such wide variations from district to district is not a recent
phenomenon. Since the introduction of the Guidelines, sentences in some districts
have been more lenient than the national averages, and leniency has persisted
despite various statutory and administrative efforts to increase uniformity.305 This
variation might be seen as a problem, or even a failure, of the Guidelines system.306
But in my view these district variations—which have been almost exclusively
tipped in favor of leniency—have been desirable. Perhaps that would not have
been so if we had achieved perfection in our national laws and policies and needed
only to bring the final recalcitrant districts into line. But that is not the case. In the
first place, there are inevitable gaps and gaffs in any large system, and that is most
assuredly true of the hodgepodge of federal criminal laws and the relatively new
system of the federal Sentencing Guidelines. More important, there are systemic
problems with our politics and the resulting policies at the national level. What
critics have called the pathological politics of crime and hyper-punitiveness have
been ascendant at the national level, as Congress has reaped the political benefits
of repeatedly expanding federal criminal law and increasing its severity.307 Federal
criminal sentences have been repeatedly ratcheted up, and the federal prison
population has expanded astronomically.308 In the view of many, the pendulum
has swung too far, but it is difficult to find a way to turn the dials back under the
glare of the national spotlight. Within some districts, however, the political
temperature is lower, and local attitudes do not demand (or perhaps support)
sentences at the highest levels. These attitudes may affect offenses across the
board, or they may affect only certain classes of offenses or offenders. The same
305

For a discussion of the legislative and administrative efforts to restrict the discretion of
individual prosecutors in the context of sentencing, see supra text accompanying notes 195–98.
306
Variations among the districts might seem to be inconsistent with one of the chief goals of
the Sentencing Reform Act, which was to eliminate the “great variation among sentences imposed by
different judges on similarly situated offenders.” Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366
(1989). Moreover, lower sentences might reflect the desire of individual federal prosecutors or U.S.
Attorneys’ Offices to reduce their workload by discounting the “price” of a federal conviction, and
measures aimed at preventing such discounts could be intended to force prosecutors to work harder to
prepare their cases. See Richman, supra note 61, at 1400 (citing statement of Professor Frank
Bowman).
307
See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505
(2001) (describing pathological forces in crime politics); Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do with
It?: The Political, Social, Psychological, and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development
of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 23, 40–44 (1997) (describing politicization of
federal criminal justice policy); Sara Sun Beale, The News Media’s Influence on Criminal Justice
Policy: How Market-Driven News Promotes Punitiveness, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 397, 405–08,
410–12 (2006) (describing increase in punitiveness in the U.S., finding the U.S. more punitive than
other Western nations, and relating changes to news media’s increasing focus on crime).
308
See Beale, supra note 168, at 761–65 (describing sentence severity in federal system); The
Sentencing
Project,
The
Federal
Prison
Population:
A
Statistical
Analysis,
http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/Documents/publications/inc_federalprisonpop.pdf
(last
visited Dec. 1, 2008) (noting that the number of federal prisoners increased by eighty-one percent
between 1995 and 2003).
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attitudes may also be reflected in parallel developments in state law and sentencing
practices.
In effect, the present system enhances the authority of locally anchored U.S.
Attorneys and reinforces the historic district-oriented structure of both the federal
courts and federal prosecutors. This has reinforced federalism, providing a
structure in which some local norms and practices can survive, and
experimentation can occur. Converting the U.S. Attorneys to career nonpartisan
employees would shift power from the districts to Washington, disturbing the
balance between the local and national.
C. Effective Administration
Redefining the U.S. Attorney as a nonpartisan civil service officer would also
affect the day-to-day administration of federal criminal law in a variety of
significant ways. Redefining the character of the position would make it more
attractive to some candidates and less attractive to others, change the public and
professional perception of the position, alter the frequency with which U.S.
Attorneys would be replaced, and spotlight the difficulty of defining effective
measures of performance. Finally, making the U.S. Attorney a career employee
would reduce democratic accountability and make it more difficult to remove a
U.S. Attorney who was ineffective.
It seems clear that changing the character of the position would change the
types of individuals who would serve. As noted above, there would be benefits to
appointing U.S. Attorneys who did not have their own political ambitions. But it is
also true that some of the most distinguished lawyers who have served as U.S.
Attorneys would have had no interest in a career position. There is widespread
agreement that a presidential appointment carries with it a great deal of prestige,
and that the loss of this prestige would be seen as effectively demoting the
position. That perception would likely be sharpened if the change were
accompanied by further centralization of authority within the Department. In
seeking to carry out her duties as the chief law enforcement official within the
district, a U.S. Attorney who is a presidential appointee may draw on both the
prestige of her position and her preexisting professional and political base within
her district. The high profile and politically active candidates currently drawn to
the position of U.S. Attorney may have an advantage in seeking to coordinate the
various federal agencies with state and local officials, many of whom are elected
officials. This is particularly valuable because the rapid expansion of federal
criminal law into areas largely left to state enforcement has made cooperation with
state investigative agencies and prosecutors absolutely essential.309 A nonpartisan
309

For example, the expanding federal efforts to prosecute violent crime depend upon the local
police, because federal agents cannot patrol the streets, do not receive 911 calls, and rarely infiltrate
gangs. Daniel Richman, The Past, Present, and Future of Violent Crime Federalism, 34 CRIME &
JUST. 377, 406 (2006). The federal emphasis on terrorism prosecutions has increased the reliance on
states investigative resources, both to coordinate with federal investigators in terrorism investigations
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career employee heading the U.S. Attorneys Office runs the risk of being
dismissed as a mere bureaucrat.310 The preference for candidates from within the
district that is inherent in the current system also favors candidates likely to have
good contacts and working relationships with state and local law enforcement
personnel. This is especially important because federal prosecutors must depend
heavily on local investigators in certain kinds of cases.
Redefining the U.S. Attorney as a nonpartisan civil service officer would
likely result in U.S. Attorneys holding their posts for longer periods. This would
have both advantages and disadvantages. It is traditional for every U.S. Attorney
to be replaced when a new president is elected, and many U.S. Attorneys do not
serve a full four year term. The periodic turnover in the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices
results in a loss of continuity, as well as substantial transition costs. Those costs
could be avoided by defining the position. On the other hand, the president’s
ability to appoint—and remove—U.S. Attorneys helps each administration to
enforce its agenda and priorities. Additionally, some scholars have expressed
concern that the increasing tenure of AUSAs may diminish their work ethic and
productivity over time, leading to an accumulation of dead wood. The same might
easily be true for a long serving U.S. Attorney, who might come to view the
position as a secure sinecure. The present system provides each new U.S. Attorney
with an incentive to make her mark during her relatively brief tenure. Moreover,
given the increased tenure of AUSAs,311 each new U.S. Attorney is assured of
having a stable of experienced assistants.
Because most presidential appointees do not come from within the U.S.
Attorney’s Offices, the traditional system of political appointments can also serve
other important values, promoting fairness and avoiding wrongful convictions.
Research on the causes of wrongful convictions has produced a large body of
scholarship describing the problem of “tunnel vision,” the unconscious cognitive
biases that plague both police and prosecutors.312 Ironically, there is evidence that
and to make up for the diversion of federal investigators from other kinds of cases. Id. at 407–16;
ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 176, at 126–29 (describing diversion of federal resources and apparent
increase in drug prosecutions based upon state and local investigations).
310
On the other hand, Ronald Goldstock has suggested that the organized crime strike forces,
which were headed by career prosecutors, functioned very effectively during the last few years before
they were eliminated, and the career prosecutors who headed these offices were able to forge very
effective working relationships with state and local officials. Telephone Interview with Ronald
Goldstock, Former Director, New York State Organized Crime Task Force, 1981–94 (Feb. 19, 2009).
311
See supra text accompanying notes 213–19.
312
I thank Bruce Green for drawing this point to my attention. For an excellent introduction to
the problem of tunnel vision in criminal cases, see Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple
Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291. See also Alafair S. Burke,
Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 512 (2007)
(discussing strategies that might help prosecutors overcome cognitive biases in discretionary
matters); Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some Lessons of Cognitive
Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006) (stating that four cognitive biases affect prosecutor’s
decision-making: confirmation bias, selective information processing, belief perseverance and the
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these biases become stronger, rather than weaker, as prosecutors gain experience,
and that they affect even prosecutors who are most committed to the ideal of doing
justice.313 The structure of the U.S. adversarial system exacerbates these natural
biases because prosecutors have constant interaction with the police, victims, and
prosecution witnesses, but little contact with the defendant, his family and friends,
and defense counsel.314 This encourages empathy and loyalty within the
prosecution team but isolation from—and often negative attitudes toward—the
defense.315 As a result, unconscious biases distort the prosecutor’s processing of
information regarding guilt or innocence. The promotion of AUSAs to be career
U.S. Attorneys would do nothing to address these problems, but the periodic
presidential appointment of U.S. Attorneys brings in new leadership with diverse
experiences, frequently including some experience doing criminal defense work.
This aspect of the selection process brings the federal system closer to the English
system of having barristers represent both the prosecution and the defense.316
Additionally, appointing U.S. Attorneys from private practice may also bring in
other skills and talents, including familiarity with the management of a large law
firm and the innovative use of technology. Since management is one of the U.S.
Attorney’s major responsibilities, experience of this nature outside the government
could be quite helpful.
Redefining the U.S. Attorney as a nonpartisan civil service officer would
reduce democratic accountability by severing the direct link between the U.S.
Attorney and the president. This would make it significantly more difficult for a
new administration to enforce its policies and priorities, because it is notoriously
difficult to alter the practices of a large bureaucracy. Moreover, the power to
appoint and remove officials is a critical element in creating and enforcing political
accountability,317 and that political accountability provides a means of checking the
very forms of prosecutorial abuse that are of greatest concern. Justice Scalia made
this point in his dissenting opinion in Morrison v. Olson:
Under our system of government, the primary check against
prosecutorial abuse is a political one. The prosecutors who exercise this
awesome discretion are selected and can be removed by a President,
avoidance of cognitive dissonance).
313
Findley & Scott, supra note 312, at 327–31.
314
Susan Bandes, Loyalty to One’s Convictions: The Prosecutor and Tunnel Vision, 49 HOW.
L.J. 475, 486–87, 490 (2006).
315
Id. at 490.
316
Cf. George C. Thomas, III, When Lawyers Fail Innocent Defendants: Exorcising the
Ghosts that Haunt the Criminal Justice System, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 25, 44–47 (suggesting reform of
U.S. adversarial system based on practice of British barristers and judge advocates in U.S. military
justice system who represent both prosecution and defense).
317
For a classic discussion of this point, see Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The
President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1994).
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whom the people have trusted enough to elect. Moreover, when crimes
are not investigated and prosecuted fairly, nonselectively, with a
reasonable sense of proportion, the President pays the cost in political
damage to his administration. If federal prosecutors “pick people that
[they] thin[k] [they] should get, rather than cases that need to be
prosecuted,” if they amass many more resources against a particular
prominent individual, or against a particular class of political protesters,
or against members of a particular political party, than the gravity of the
alleged offenses or the record of successful prosecutions seems to
warrant, the unfairness will come home to roost in the Oval Office.318
Justice Scalia would likely argue that furor created by the U.S. Attorney firings
and the Congressional investigations into claims of prosecutorial abuse prove his
point.
Appointing career U.S. Attorneys would also go hand in hand with
centralizing more authority in Main Justice. Although the Bush administration’s
removal of the U.S. Attorneys was extraordinarily haphazard and unprofessional,
the Department has attempted to develop effective systems for reviewing the
performance of each U.S. Attorneys Office. Unfortunately, few good performance
measures have been devised, and there is a great danger of reliance on crude
measures that emphasize quantity rather than quality.319 The present system
responds to these problems in two ways. First, it creates a direct link between each
U.S. Attorney and the administration that has appointed her, increasing the
likelihood that she shares the administration’s values and priorities. Second, it
limits the damage that a poorly performing U.S. Attorney can do, since she can be
removed by the president, and, in any event, will leave office at the end of the
administration. Redefining the position as one subject to civil service type
protections, in contrast, would make the removal of a U.S. Attorney who did not
perform well extremely difficult.

318
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727–28 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). But see Kahan,
supra note 64, at 487 (arguing that the Department of Justice “lacks the adequate political incentives
to check individual U.S. Attorneys, especially once they have initiated sensational prosecutions”).
319
See generally Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Al Capone’s Revenge: An Essay on
the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 615 (2005) (noting the
general tension between measures of quality and quantity). For example, a U.S. Attorney may have
the choice of bringing several quick and easy gun prosecutions based on the work of local police or
one complex fraud case that will require a grand jury investigation and substantial prosecutorial
resources. David Richman, Response, Judging Untried Cases: In response to Trial Distortion and the
end of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 219, 223 (2007);
http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/11-2007/richman.pdf. There has been substantial criticism of
the Department’s terrorism case statistics; critics claim the Department includes a large number of
minor cases with little or no connection to terrorism. See Robert M. Chesney, Federal Prosecution of
Terrorism-Related Offenses: Conviction and Sentencing Data In Light of the “Soft-Sentence” and
“Data-Reliability” Critiques, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 851, 873–76 (2007).
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D. Other Mechanisms to Buffer Political Influences
It would take a very strong case to bring about change in the present system of
appointing U.S. Attorneys, because both the president and the Senate benefit.
Given the value of lodging authority at the district level and the administrative
advantages of the current system, it is difficult to argue that the case has been made
for converting the position of U.S. Attorney to a nonpartisan career appointment.
Because the danger of improper political influences is nonetheless real, the better
course is to find mechanisms to prevent or at least mute the worst of the political
pressures that have been brought to bear on U.S. Attorneys from time to time.
Although I do not favor restricting the president’s removal power, three other
options seem promising: screening or nominations panels, restrictions on contact
between U.S. Attorneys and political officials, and clarifying and perhaps
restricting the scope of the offenses used to prosecute state and local corruption.
1. Limitations on removal
Although this article begins with a focus on the firing of U.S. Attorneys, I do
not advocate limiting the president’s authority to remove a U.S. Attorney. To
some degree, this is simply one consequence of my position that the U.S.
Attorneys should remain presidential appointees.320 In my view, the president
should have the authority to appoint individuals who share his administration’s
priorities and to remove a U.S. Attorney, such as Carol Lamm, who fails to follow
those priorities.
In addition, two factors have changed the landscape, reducing the likelihood
that the president will remove U.S. Attorneys for improper reasons or that U.S.
Attorneys will feel threatened by the possibility of removal. The first change is the
repeal of the short lived provision giving the Attorney General the unilateral
authority to appoint an interim U.S. Attorney. Because the president’s power to
appoint a replacement is now subject to the counterweight of Senate confirmation,
the temptation to remove a U.S. Attorney for improper reasons has been reduced.
The second factor is the firestorm of controversy that the Bush Administration’s
actions aroused. Future presidents know that they will not have the unfettered
choice of a replacement and that the removal of a U.S. Attorney will be closely
scrutinized. Indeed, one way of reading the events described here is as a success
story: as a result of public outcry the system corrected itself. These factors seem
likely to have a major effect on the calculus of all of the actors, at least in the near
future.321
320
But see Weiss, supra note 260, at 348–63 (arguing that Congress possesses the
constitutional authority to restrain the president's removal of U.S. Attorneys, and proposing
legislation that would require a report of the grounds for removal and provide removed U.S. Attorney
with a cause of action to challenge her removal).
321
Indeed, some concern has been expressed that the future presidents will be unduly deterred
from removing U.S. Attorneys whose performance is substandard. I do not view this as a serious
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2. Nominating or screening panels
A more promising option is the use of nominating or screening panels. These
panels could serve a number of valuable purposes, depending upon how they were
structured. There are many models of selection panels for judges,322 and bills
including merit selection commissions were introduced in Congress in the late
1970s.323 Senators in nine states currently use panels to recommend candidates for
judicial vacancies, and in three states the same panels recommend U.S. Attorney
candidates.324 A system in which a commission or panel presents a slate of
potential nominees for the consideration of the president can buffer the U.S.
Attorney to some degree from her political masters (both the president and the
home state senators), and it might also open the selection process up to candidates
of substantial professional accomplishment who lack strong political ties to the
administration. Yet the final choice would remain that of the president (who may
consider political factors),325 and the U.S. Attorney would retain the prestige and
concern because prior administrations very seldom found it necessary to remove U.S. Attorneys
before the end of their term. See supra text accompanying notes 240–44.
322
See generally THE AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, MODEL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROVISIONS (2008),
available at http://www.ajs.org/selection/docs/MJSP_web.pdf. (providing a detailed merit selection
plan for judges and commentary on the practices of existing merit selection commissions). In 2008,
the American Bar Association House of Delegates adopted a resolution recommending the
establishment of bipartisan panels to nominate candidates for the federal judiciary. See Amanda
Bronstad, Cooling off Judicial Selections: Push for Bipartisan Panels Debated, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 8,
2008, at 1.
323
Two bills introduced in 1978, H.R. 10514, 95th Cong. (1978) and H.R. 12654, 95th Cong.
(1978), revised the selection process for U.S. Attorneys, creating strong merit selection commissions.
These bills were in response to the Carter administration’s removal of U.S. Attorney David W.
Marston after its initial endorsement of merit selection. See Selection and Removal of U.S. Attorneys:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 48 (1978) (statements of Griffin Bell, Att’y Gen. of the United
States, and Rep. Tom Railsback); see also Editorial, On the Selection of U.S. Attorneys, 61
JUDICATURE 396, 396 (1978) (discussing Marston’s removal and merit selection of U.S. Attorneys).
324
AMERICAN
JUDICATURE
SOCIETY,
FEDERAL
JUDICIAL
SELECTION,
http://www.judicialselection.us/federal_judicial_selection/federal_judicial_nominating_commissions.
cfm?state=FD (last visited Feb. 16, 2009) (describing nominating commissions in California,
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin) [hereinafter
AJS FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION]. The panels in California, Florida, and Washington recommend
candidates for U.S. Attorney. See id. (describing California panels); Florida Federal Judicial
Nominating Commission, Rules of Procedure, Revised August 2007, available at
http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/FL_FJNC__rules_69517EF8A0D80.pdf
(last
visited Feb. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Florida Nominating Commission]; Wisconsin Federal Nominating
Charter,
available
at
http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/WI_charter_D88C3BA6A5469.pdf (last visited
Feb. 16, 2009) [hereinafter Wisconsin Nominating Charter].
325
Indeed, the president could even be given the option of making a selection not included on
the list. See, e.g., H.R. 11018, 95th Cong. (1978) (creating a merit selection commission to propose
nominees for U.S. district judge, U.S. Attorney, and U.S. marshal but suggesting only that the
President “be guided by the list”).
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authority that comes with a presidential appointment. The process also retains
senatorial influence at the confirmation stage.326
Moreover, the makeup of the selection panel can be fine tuned to increase or
decrease the influence of the president and home state senators. The authority to
name the members of the selection panel could be lodged in either the president or
the home state senators. Restrictions may be imposed on the makeup of the panel,
such as a requirement that there be a balance in political party affiliation.327 The
panels could also include individuals with key perspectives on the appointment,
such as the local chief judge, the outgoing U.S. Attorney, and/or members
representing the state bar.328
The nominating panels presently in use by various senators demonstrate some
of the options. Most, but not all, of the commissions were established by and
report to both senators.329 California is unusual. Each senator has appointed her
own commission, and they will alternate in screening, interviewing, and
recommending candidates for federal judgeships as well as for U.S. Attorney and
U.S. marshal.330 Most of the panels operate statewide, but again California is
unusual in having separate panels for each judicial district.331 Florida has a single
statewide commission, but it is made up of three conferences that correspond to the
federal judicial districts.332 The panels vary widely in size, having as few as six or
as many as fifty-six members.333 In most cases, the senators appoint all members
of the panels, but there are exceptions, including the inclusion of some members to
326
But cf. supra note 258, at 218 (proposal of former U.S. Attorney Whitney North Seymour
to have the president select U.S. Attorneys from a list proposed by a circuit-wide nominating
committee but not to make the positions subject to Senate confirmation).
327
See, e.g., H.R. 10514, 95th Cong. (1978) (“No more than three members of each
commission may be members of the same political affiliation”); H.R. 12654, 95th Cong. (1978)
(same).
328
Cf. Selection and Removal of U.S. Attorneys: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. 98
(1978) (statement of Rep. John B. Anderson) (suggesting that U.S. Attorney nominating panel could
include outgoing U.S. Attorney, individuals appointed by the chief judge of the federal judicial
circuit, the chief judge of the federal district court, bar associations, and the Governor).
329
In Colorado, Senator Salazar uses a nominating commission, but Senator Udall does not.
AJS FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION, supra note 324.
330
Id. (describing California process announced in early 2009).
331
Id.
332
Florida Nominating Commission, supra note 324, Rules 6–10. All members of the state
wide commission receive and rank all applicants, and after consideration of the rankings, the
conference in question invites candidates for interviews, deliberates in closed session, and then
certifies no fewer than three applicants per vacancy. Id. Rules 17, 21–24. The chair of the statewide
commission is a member of each of the conferences. Id. Rule 6.
333
The smallest panels are found in Georgia and Washington, which have six members, and
Colorado, which has eight. The largest are Florida, with 56 members, and Texas, which has varied
from 28 to 40 members since its inception in 1986. AJS FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION, supra note
324.
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be named by the state bar334 and mechanisms that account for the lack of a senator
from the president=s party.335 The panels in Colorado and Washington are
bipartisan.336 In most states the panels provide a slate of names to the senators, but
in Colorado it appears that the nominating commission forwards its
recommendations directly to the White House.337 There are also other variations,
including Florida=s requirement that all application materials be available to the
public and that interviews be open to the public.338
Screening or rating panels, on the other hand, would provide less of a
restriction on the president and the home state senators, since these panels would
not generate a field of candidates. Screening panels would, however, provide
some greater assurance of the U.S. Attorneys’ professional experience and
reputation,339 and increasing the visibility of the appointment in the local
professional community may strengthen the U.S. Attorney’s ability to occasionally
resist pressures from Main Justice. The American Bar Association’s screening of
judicial nominations provides one model that could be adapted to the nomination
of U.S. Attorneys.340
The use of screening or nomination panels has another advantage: they can be
(and have been) employed in individual districts without any legislative
authorization.341 This is consistent with the approach advocated here of allowing
variations among judicial districts, and use in individual districts can provide a
334
Both Hawaii and Wisconsin provide for members designated by the state bar association,
and Wisconsin also includes the dean of one of the state’s law schools. Id.
335
Hawaii’s charter provides that when neither senator is a member of the president’s party,
the panel shall consist of eight members: two selected by the state=s senior senator, one by the state’s
junior senator, one by the state bar, and four chosen by the highest ranking member of the president’s
party.
Hawaii Federal Judicial Selection Commission, § 2, available at
http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/HI_FJSC_charter_DFA1FE5BF22BE.pdf
(last
visited Feb. 16, 2009). If, however, the state’s senators are from the president’s party, the
commission expands to nine members, with four chosen by the senior senator, three by the junior
senator, and two by the state bar. Wisconsin’s commission charter makes provision for three
possibilities: both senators of a different party than the president, both of the same party as the
president, and one senator from the president’s party. Wisconsin Nominating Charter, supra note
324.
336
AJS FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION, supra note 324.
337
Id.
338
Florida Nominating Commission, supra note 324, Rule 23.
339
Upon occasion, U.S. Attorneys with little or no litigation experience have been appointed.
See supra note 268.
340
For a description of the ABA process, see AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDING
COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS (2007), available at
http://www.abanet.org/scfedjud/federal_judiciary07.pdf.
341
For example, in 2001 the Bush administration and California’s two Democratic senators,
Dianne Feinstein and Barbara Boxer, agreed to develop a bipartisan selection process for judges and
U.S. Attorneys that would avoid protracted nomination fights. See Richard B. Schmitt, Justice Aide
Took Lead to Replace Prosecutor, L.A. TIMES, May 23, 2007, at 1, available at 2007 WLNR
9647884 (describing the commission and Monica Goodling’s attempt to circumvent it).
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base of experience that might ultimately guide legislation on a national level. In
the absence of legislative change, it would be very desirable for more senators to
experiment with the use of such panels to assist in the selection of U.S. Attorneys
and for scholars to study the operation of the existing panels. Additionally,
professional groups, such as the ABA and the American Judicature Society, should
consider recommending legislation to require the use of either nominating or
screening panels.
3. Regulating contact between individual federal prosecutors and political
actors
Regardless of the system of appointing U.S. Attorneys, renewed attention
should be given to regulating the contacts between the U.S. Attorney (and their
staffs) and various political actors, both within and outside of the administration in
which they serve. Since the post-Watergate period, the Department has had
internal regulations intended to insulate its decision making from improper
influences. The regulations have become less stringent in some respects over time,
and there is evidence that, in at least one significant case, they were not followed.
More attention should be given to three issues: the persons within the Department
who are authorized to speak to representatives of the White House and Congress
concerning individual investigations and cases, the permissible nature of those
conversations, and the mechanisms to ensure that the new standards are followed.
For at least thirty years, the Department has had internal regulations that
imposed limitation on communications with the White House and Congress.342
These regulations are intended to insulate the U.S. Attorneys (and others) from
influences that should not affect decisions in particular criminal or civil cases, to
preserve the Department’s independence, and to prevent even the appearance of
conflicts of interest.343 It is difficult to track the applicable policy precisely
throughout the period in question, because it was incorporated into various
versions of the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual but also supplemented by a series of letters
342
I have not been able to locate the original policy. The U.S. Attorneys’ Manual from 1984
states that it is announcing and restating a policy announced in 1978. See infra note 343.
343
USAM, supra note 26, at § 1-8.200 provided:
The Assistant Attorneys General, the U.S. Attorneys and the heads of the investigative
agencies in the Department . . . must be insulated from influences that should not affect
decisions in particular criminal or civil cases. To ensure that this occurs, to continue the
independence of the Department of Justice, to prevent even the appearance of conflicts of
interest and to provide for the most efficient and effective system of proper
communications with outside parties, specific procedures must be provided to regulate
communication concerning pending cases. Consequently, the following paragraphs
restate and clarify the procedures initially announced in 1978.

A. All inquiries and information concerning pending investigations, matters or cases from
either the White House Staff or the Congress should be directed to the Offices of the
Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, or the Associate Attorney General. . . .
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and memoranda from the Attorneys General. Oversight hearings in the Senate
revealed that at least from 1993 to 2002 the Attorney General’s written policy
stringently limited contact between the White House and the Department
concerning individual cases.344 Initial communications were authorized for only
seven individuals: the Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate
Attorney General, the President, Vice President, White House Counsel, and
Deputy White House Counsel.345 During the Bush Administration, however,
successive revisions greatly expanded the group of individuals authorized to
communicate concerning individual cases, first to 417 individuals in the White
House and 42 in the Department, and later to 895 people in the White House and
42 in the Department.346 On the Congressional side, the United States Attorneys’
Manual now provides that any Congressional inquiry to a U.S. Attorney seeking
non-public information about individual cases must be referred to a designated
congressional liaison, which is presently the counsel to the director of the
Executive Office of United States Attorneys.347
The new policies reflected the perception that limiting contact to only the
senior Department leadership would create a bottleneck, and that such a bottleneck
was especially problematic following 9/11.348 On the other hand, the relaxed
policies allowed hundreds of individuals within Congress and the Executive
Branch, whose duties are primarily or exclusively political, to have greater access
to and contact with individuals who are making prosecutorial decisions. They also
allowed contacts at a lower level within the Department. This can create the
appearance of impropriety, undermining public confidence in the neutrality and
impartiality of federal prosecutions. It also increases the difficulty of making
nuanced determinations about the propriety of providing information in individual
cases.
Because the Department’s publications were not amended to reflect the
change in policy, these changes came to light only as a result of multiple inquiries
in the course of Congressional oversight hearings. Concern about the extent to
344
See S. Rep. No. 110-203, at 2–6 (2007) (describing hearings and findings); id. at 13–19
(reproducing letter and memoranda from Attorneys General in 1994, 2002, and 2006). The 2006
memoranda were not incorporated into the published ORGANIZATIONS AND FUNCTIONS MANUAL. Id.
at 3. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS MANUAL, § 32(1) (1998), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title1/doj00032.htm.
345
See S. REP. NO. 110-203, supra note 344, at 2.
346
Id. at 2–3, 14–19.
347
USAM,
supra
note
26,
at
§
1-8.001
to
.030,
available
at
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title1/8mdoj.htm (last visited Dec. 11,
2008).
348
See The Role of the Department of Justice, http://www.acslaw.org/node/5208 (July 2007)
(last visited on December 11, 2008) (video and transcript of an ACS National Convention Panel
examining the historical relationship between the Justice Department, including statements by former
Deputy Attorney General Jamie Gorelick describing restrictive policy during the Clinton
administration, and statements by Gorelick and Viet Dinh that policy changed in Bush administration,
particularly following 9/11).
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which disclosures were being permitted led the Senate Judiciary Committee to
approve a bill that would require semi-annual reports to Congress describing which
Department of Justice and White House personnel had communications regarding
ongoing Departmental investigations or cases.349 Shortly thereafter, Attorney
General Mukasey issued a new policy that limited initial communications
regarding any specific criminal or civil matter to four individuals: the Attorney
General, the Deputy Attorney General, the Counsel to the President, and the
Deputy Counsel to the President.350
The problems noted in Parts I and II suggest the importance of tight controls
on communications between those charged with making prosecutorial decisions in
federal cases and those in Congress and the White House whose roles are political.
Contacts should be limited to a smaller group of individuals who have significant
stature and experience. The Mukasey memorandum reinstitutes tight controls on
communications by the White House as a matter of internal Departmental policy.
It is unclear whether further safeguards are needed, given the unannounced
amendment of the governing policy during the Bush administration. Moreover, at
this point it appears that the controls on the Congressional side of the equation may
also deserve attention. The director of the Executive Office of U.S. Attorneys is
not a presidential appointee, nor is the counsel to the director. Authorizing
Congressional contacts at this level of the Department for communications
concerning individual investigations or prosecutions is quite different than
channeling all contacts through the senior leadership. It may also be possible to be
more specific about the nature of the communications that are subject to
limitations. For example, imposing restrictions only on initial communications
seems to leave the door open for problems.
But whatever policy is adopted, it must be followed to be effective. U.S.
Attorney David Iglesias conceded that he did not report the calls he received from
his senator and congresswoman, despite the fact that he felt they were improper.351
Perhaps Iglesias’ failure to comply with the policy was very unusual, but it
suggests the desirability of enhancing efforts to publicize the policy within the
Department and stress the importance of compliance.352 The question whether the
idea of a statutory reporting requirement has merit turns on a determination of
whether the problems encountered during the Bush administration were sui
generis, or reflect a need for continuous oversight.353
349

See S. 1845, 110th Cong., 1st Sess. (2007), and S. Rep. 110-203, supra note 344, at 7.
Memorandum from Michael Mukasey, Attorney General, to Heads of Department
Components and United States Attorneys 2 (December 19, 2007) (on file with the Ohio State Journal
of Criminal Law).
351
See supra text accompanying note 27.
352
Cf. Memorandum from Michael Mukasey, Attorney General, supra note 350 (stating that
one function of the memorandum was to “ensure that everyone is aware of the rules and their
importance”).
353
If a statutory reporting requirement were enacted, it would need to provide a mechanism to
avoid making public sensitive information regarding ongoing investigations. See S. REP. NO. 110350

438

OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW

[Vol 6:369

4. Clarifying (and perhaps restricting) the scope of political corruption
offenses
Mechanisms that modulate political pressure and contact will be beneficial,
but attention should also be given to the other aspect of the problem that was
highlighted in the prosecutions of Georgia Thompson and former Governor
Seigelman.354 The breadth and elasticity of the federal offenses used to prosecute
state and local corruption enhance the scope of federal law and, accordingly, also
enhance the scope of prosecutorial discretion. There is much less dispute about the
propriety of a federal prosecution that is based upon a corrupt quid pro quo, and
the decision to bring such a prosecution is generally based solely on the strength of
the evidence. In the case of the more amorphous argument that a state or local
official deprived the citizens of his or her honest services, however, the prosecutor
is not merely assessing the strength of the evidence, but in many cases is also
seeking to expand the definition of the conduct that constitutes a crime. It is easy
to see why prosecutions of the latter sort generate claims of unfairness when the
defendants are members of the party that does not control the executive branch,
and hence the power of prosecution.
The question whether (and how) to redefine the offenses of mail fraud, wire
fraud, and federal program bribery falls outside the scope of this article, but it is
clearly one important piece of the puzzle that should be reexamined. Legislation
defining the offenses in question more clearly would be desirable, but it is not the
only way to achieve greater clarity about the scope of these offenses. Because of
the importance of providing clear standards in this context, this might be an
appropriate topic for uniform national standards spelled out in the U.S. Attorneys
Manual.355 It would be particularly helpful if the Manual addressed and provided
guidance on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the use of broad amorphous
offenses, such as mail fraud, in the specific context of public corruption offenses
where the Manual might address, for example, the question whether a quid pro quo
is required. One problem with this approach is that provisions in the U.S.
Attorneys Manual are not ordinarily judicially enforceable.356
203, supra note 344, at 11 (minority view of Sen. Kyl).
354
See supra text accompanying notes 83–122.
355
Dan Kahan has gone further, advocating that Congress formally delegate interpretive
authority to the Department of Justice, “whose reasonable, pre-litigation interpretations of vaguely
worded criminal statutes would be binding on the courts” under a Chevron regime. See Dan M.
Kahan, Reallocating Interpretative Criminal-Lawmaking Power Within the Executive Branch, 61 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 47, 53–54 (1998).
356
See Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing “Discretionary Justice,”
13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 175–85 (2003) (describing cases holding that defendants may
not enforce various Department of Justice guidelines). See also id. at 196 (arguing that courts should
allow defendants to use violations of internal guidelines as evidence of prosecutorial misconduct and
require prosecutors who did not comply with departmental guidelines to bear the burden of showing
they did not engage in misconduct).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The principal responsibility for federal prosecutions in each federal judicial
district should remain in the hands of a presidential appointee who has been
confirmed by the Senate. To be sure, as Part I demonstrates, some serious
problems occurred during the Bush Administration, and other charges remain
under review. Moreover, these problems are not unique to one administration. But
as noted in Part III, measures can be taken to modulate or block pressures that
might distort the U.S. Attorney’s decision making in individual cases. Those
measures are preferable to converting the position of U.S. Attorney to a career civil
service role. The Department’s current two-level structure and its very large
number of presidential appointees are anomalous, but they serve important
functions: increasing the effectiveness of the U.S. Attorneys as the chief law
enforcement officer in each district, and preserving the local orientation of federal
criminal law enforcement.

